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Abstract
The growing modernization of traditional Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPSs) has
increased the probability and effectiveness of cyber attacks by integrating modern communication technologies that expose security vulnerabilities like lack of access control policies
to adversaries. The exponential growth of cyber attacks has caught the attention of stakeholders that have proposed cybersecurity initiatives to protect ICPSs. ICPSs are part
of the Critical National Infrastructures (CNIs) supporting the society’s sustainability and
national security. The cybersecurity initiatives aiming to address cyber attacks proposed
by stakeholders must continuously authenticate constrained devices. Operational thresholds and process integrity assurance must also be maintained. A centralized ICPS consists
of constrained devices and legacy communication protocols that lack robust state-of-art
crypto solutions. The lack of robust security standards in an ICPS enables security vulnerabilities like broken authentication, lack of integrity checks, and single point of failure
attacks that adversaries can exploit to compromise the operational hours through breaches
of process data and prolonged outages. Therefore, a robust provenance platform that ensures continuous device authentication and system process integrity through overhead-aware,
lightweight, and non-intrusive mechanisms is of highest need which is the primary focus in
this dissertation.
Standard cryptographic solutions, such as public-key cryptography and cryptographic
hashing functions, are unsuitable for the resource-constrained field sensors in traditional
ICPSs. Thus, a lightweight mechanism is needed to ensure continuous authentication while
achieving system process integrity assurance. Considering the unique pull-push-based operational models of traditional ICPSs, this thesis integrates Physical Unclonable Functions
(PUFs) into the ICPS ecosystem. PUFs are hardware security mechanisms providing resilient continuous authentication by deriving unique and unclonable fingerprints from the
physical characteristics of integrated circuits. PUFs also address core security vulnerabili-
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ties, such as a lack of authentication and integrity assurance. This thesis also addresses the
single point of failure risks commonly found at a centralized ICPS. Traditional ICPSs follow
a hierarchical architecture that adversaries can exploit to impact the operational hours of
ICPSs through Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. In general, DoS attacks impact the operational hours of single essential devices like the master controller. The collaboration of
multiple ICPSs can reduce the probability of cyber attacks. Thus, this thesis integrates a
large and multi-site decentralized platform for achieving access control and accountability,
thus introducing state-of-art decentralized practice security monitoring solutions to ICPSs.
We also implement a novel High-Fidelity Testbed (HFT) to provide prototyping capability to address the rapid growth of cyber attacks on traditional ICPSs. Stakeholders
require experimental HFTs that can provide flexible, mobile, and scalable capabilities in a
highly evolving ecosystem. The HFT’s flexibility can also be leveraged to evaluate novel cyber attack solutions. Using state-of-art technologies, we develop automated plug-and-play
capabilities that integrate next-gen hardware to assess and compare the operational performance of devices. We evaluate the efficiency of state-of-art devices and approaches for
preventing standard cyber attacks, such as identity spoofing and false sequential attacks.
This dissertation analyzes the performance, efficiency, and security attributes of integrating distributed ledger platforms and suitable lightweight crypto solutions in traditional
ICPS ecosystems. In general, three essential research objectives are addressed: (1) robust
sensor continuous identity management that eliminates rogue devices from ICPS networks,
thus ensuring the trustworthiness of field devices; (2) scalable system process integrity assurance that prevents malicious runtime behaviors from adversaries; and (3) prototyping
development and evaluation of decentralized ICPS architecture to provide detailed performance insights in high-fidelity scenarios.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Table 1.1: Table of Acronyms
Abbreviation

Definition

AbIDS

Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection System

AES

Advanced Encryption Standard

APT

Advance Persistent Threats

BloSPAI

Blockchain-based SRAM PUF Authentication and Integrity

CE

Combustion Efficiency

CISA

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

CNI

Critical National Infrastructure

COTS

Commercial Off-The-Shelf

CRDB

Challenge-Response Database

CRP

Challenge-Response Pair

DER

Distributed Energy Systems

DNP3

Distributed Network Protocol 3

DLS

Distributed Ledger Service

DoS

Denial-of-Service

ECC

Error Correction Code

FFP

Fossil Power Plant

FL

Federated Learning

HDS

Hadoop Distributed File System
Continued on next page
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Table 1.1 – continued from previous page
Abbreviation

Definition

HFS

Hyperledger Fabric Service

HFT

High-Fidelity Testbed

HITL

Hardware-In-The-Loop

HLF

Hyperledger Fabric

HMAC

Hash-based Message Authentication Code

HMI

Human Machine Interface

I4.0

Industry 4.0

ICPS

Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems

ICS

Industrial Control Systems

IDMZ

Industrial Demilitarized Zone

IDS

Intrusion Detection Systems

IEB

Identity Based Encryption

IEFD

Internet-Enabled Field Devices

IoT

Internet of Things

K8S

Kubernetes

MAB

Multi-Armed Bandit

MBRSV

Model-based Runtime State Verification

MDP

Markov Decision Process

MITM

Man-In-The-Middle

ML

Machine Learning

MTU

Master Terminal Unit

MRA

Mandatory Result Autonoma

NIST

National Institute and Technology

NFS

Network File System

OT

Operational Technology
Continued on next page
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Table 1.1 – continued from previous page
Abbreviation

Definition

P2P

Peer-to-Peer

PLC

Programmable Logic Controller

PPO

Proximal Policy Optimization

PUF

Physical Unclonable Function

RL

Reinforcement Learning

RRI

Reinforcement Learning-based Runtime-system-state Integrity

RSAS

Resilient Sensor Authentication Service

RSV

Runtime State Verification

RTU

Remote Terminal Unit

RTV

Runtime Verification

SB3

Stable Baselines 3

SCADA

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

SMR

Small Modular Reactor

SoH

State-of-Health

SPAI

SRAM PUF Authentication and Integrity

SPI

System Process Integrity

SRAM

Static Random Access Memory

TPM

Trusted Platform Module

TS

Timestamp

VM

Virtual Machine
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1.1

Cyber-Physical Systems

Critical National Infrastructures (CNI) are an essential component for the development
and sustainability of our society [1]. This is because the assets, systems, and networks of
CNI, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital that even minimal disruptions
would have disastrous effects on national security, economy, and public health. From the
sixteen critical infrastructure domains [2] identified by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the energy sector is considered to be the most important as
it provides enabling functions that different sectors rely on. In the U.S., more than 80%
of the country’s energy infrastructure is owned by the private sector [2], and without a
stable supply of energy, an economy cannot function. The energy sector consists of more
than 6,413 power plants from which 48% of electricity is produced from coal combustion,
20% from nuclear, and 22% from natural gas [2]. The remaining generation is distributed
among hydroelectric plants (6%), oil (1%), and renewable sources (3%). Thus, it is acknowledged that secure and resilient energy infrastructures are vital for a progressive and
sustained economy. The broad services and architectures of the energy sector illustrate the
heterogeneously of constrained devices, applications, networks, and communication protocols that are the backbone of large-scale CNI. Any potential cyber attack on the backbone
infrastructure of CNI can impact the operational hours of critical sectors through prolonged
outages that result in costly systems backups and production downtime. The U.S. Cyber
Consequence Unit estimates that a single wave of cyber attacks to CNI could have an approximate cost of $700 billion [3]. Therefore, securing the assets of CNI from state-of-art
cyber adversaries has become a significant concern for industry and government to protect
the nation’s critical assets.
The recent growth of cyber attacks that primarily target legacy embedded devices exposed the security vulnerabilities of traditional Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems (ICPS).
Some examples of cyber attacks include on February 2011, the Conficker [4] worm that
infected a Brazilian power plant, causing not display data and freeze-up of control systems.
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In 2013 and 2014 a Stuxnet-like [5] trojan compromised 1,000 energy control systems in
84 countries. In 2017 the hacking group called Dragonfly obtained operational access to
possible 21 U.S. energy control systems. A WannaCry [6] ransomware impacted 800,000
households causing bill-payment operations to be suspended. Moreover, in 2021, a group of
cybercriminals exploited the infrastructure weaknesses to temporarily shut off the supply
of gasoline, resulting in gas shortages in parts of the Eastern United States that impacted
the lives and livelihoods of American society [7]. Lastly, in 2010 the Stuxnet attack was
considered the first cyber-weapon [8], it targeted specific Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLCs) at five uranium enrichment Iranian organizations. A report from the cybersecurity
firm Kaspersky from the year 2020 [9] identified major gaps in the industry to deploy robust cyber solution implementations to address security threats; the report surveyed the
employees from different power generation plans that identified the following gaps: 34%
of cybersecurity issues cannot be addressed quickly due to undesired production outages,
28% of management are afraid of losing confidential information, and 27% responded that
cost of incident and response mitigation is a crucial factor.
After massive dedicated cyber attacks on ICPS and millions of dollars in costs to recover
from them [3], the importance of cybersecurity in CNI is now being realized both by government and private sectors. To encourage security awareness and understanding of security
threats in ICPS, a significant efforts are being made by inter-disciplinary researchers and
academicians. Achieving standard operational requirements of ICPS like high reliability,
and low latency requires novel architectures and communication protocols suitable for the
resource-constrained devices commonly found at ICPS. In general, ICPS are data-driven
architectures, i.e., Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems make critical operational decisions based on sensing data gathered by constrained field sensors are
the backbone of traditional ICPS. Rogue data and processes can potentially impact the
operational hours of SCADA systems through prolonged outages, breaches of private data,
and hardware/software components. As shown in Figure 1.1, adversaries can exploit security vulnerabilities such as lack of robust authentication mechanisms and broken integrity
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Figure 1.1: Common cybersecurity threats in traditional ICS
processes to compromise diverse assets from constrained field devices to legacy communication protocols. Thus, a trusted and constant data flow from field sensors is essential
for the operational hours of SCADA systems. Therefore, organizations must implement
lightweight up-to-date cyber and crypto solutions to ensure secure data flow and process
integrity. At the same time, the much-needed security objectives, such as authentication
and nonrepudiation, must be inherently taken care of.
Cyber attacks like Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks can significantly impact the
operational hours of ICPS systems through data manipulation attacks, identity spoofing
attacks, session hijacking, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, and sequential logic attacks.
Therefore, ensuring process integrity, data integrity, and the proper management of the
sensor’s identity is essential for next-generation and current ICPS. Goal: This dissertation
aims to investigate and architect a robust provenance platform for generic ICPS that ensures continuous device authentication and system process integrity through overhead-aware,
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lightweight, and non-intrusive mechanisms. Through enabling continuous validation, the
novel resilient SCADA system will address some of the significant security vulnerabilities
such as (i) data flow integrity and (ii) device identity while taking care of the much-needed
security objectives like authentication, integrity, data provenance, and nonrepudiation. If
traditional ICPS systems adopt novel communication protocols and operational standards
to address legacy systems and devices’ security vulnerabilities to reduce the success probability of future cyber attacks. This highlights the following research objectives:
• Provide device continuous identity management through decentralized
platforms. Commonly, ICPS lacks robust security mechanisms to ensure devices’
identity because of heavy performance trade-offs. Rather, they depend on legacy
communication protocols designed to provide network ability among trusted devices.
Specific research questions to be addressed under this objective are:
(1) Given the resource-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) nodes, what mechanism
could we devise that uniquely identify the legacy field devices and perform continuous
authentication to avoid node and data maliciousness?
(2) How decentralization techniques and tools, such as permissioned Blockchains, can
be leveraged to ensure resiliency in continuous authentication process while achieving
minimal overhead?
(3) Given the Peer-to-Peer characteristics of blockchain platforms, how can we ensure achieving scalable performance in transaction throughput under the required
ICS/SCADA network latency threshold required as per Industry 4.0 needs?
• Provide process integrity assurance in ICPS. The push-pull mechanism of
legacy communication in ICPS takes the trustworthiness of processes and devices
for granted. Specific research questions to be addressed under this objective are:
(1) Design and implementation of behavior-based anomaly detectors at preventing
semantic attacks and false sequential logic attacks for state-of-art ICPS.
(2) Develop generic scalable process integrity model that addresses the complexity
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and dynamism of traditional ICPS introduced by heterogeneous devices and communication protocols.
(3) Given the complex environment of ICPS and the large number of factors that
impact the runtime state of field devices, how can we implement an intelligent agent
to accurately estimate the SoH of field devices?
• Develop high-fidelity prototype for evaluation and testing. Due the rapid
growth of cyber attacks to ICPS, stakeholders are in desperate need of experimental
testbeds that can provide a flexible, scalable, and interoperable platform for performing diverse cybersecurity experiments. Specific research questions to be addressed
under this objective are:
(1) Dynamically instantiate and evaluate performance of continuous authentication
in a large scale ICPS environment.
(2) Develop automated plug-in capability to integrate hardware field sensors and program logic controllers to evaluate and compare performance of devised mechanisms.

1.2

Continuous Device Authentication

State-of-art ICPS systems are characterized [10] for having large-scale heterogeneous devices that transfer control data and sensing data across multiple layers of the architecture.
ICPS systems maintain two crucial data flows: (1) control data flow and (2) sensing data
flow. Control data flow processes the state of physical devices, which can be considered
[11] as the combination of the parameter value, execution time, and sequential logic. In
general, the legacy communication protocol of ICPS like Modbus [12] protocol assumes a
trusted, and secure environment [13]. Thus, in traditional ICPS, the device’s identity is not
ensured and is assumed to be trusted. The lack of robust security mechanisms introduces
security vulnerabilities such as broken authentication and exposure of sensitive data. An
attacker can exploit these security vulnerabilities to introduce rogue devices that transmit
self-damaging commands to critical devices or expose confidential business data to third
8

parties. Previous work [14, 15, 16] have proposed lightweight security primitives to ensure
continuous authentication of constrained devices. However, those approaches utilize complex and costly Error Correction Codes (ECC), which, although necessary are not suitable
for constrained field devices because of their high footprint and overhead. Therefore, a
lightweight framework to continuously authenticate constrained devices with a negligible
overhead is necessary.

1.2.1

Data Integrity

Sensing data flow refers to field sensors’ capacity to send back data gathered from their
surrounding environment. A supervisory device like the SCADA master takes the sensing data from field sensors to make critical operational decisions. As shown in Figure 1.2
SCADA systems are data-driven architectures that require consistent and honest sensing
data flow from lower layers of the system [10]. An attacker can exploit the security vulnerabilities [17, 18, 3, 19] of SCADA systems to introduce rogue data, which can trigger
prolonged outages, e.g., in an integrity attack, an adversary can send rogue information
like an incorrect temperature measurement from sensors or controllers. Thus, triggering
an emergency shutdown due to loss of adequate combustion temperature in the context
of coal-based power generation plants. Although state-of-art crypto solutions have been
proven [20, 21, 22] efficient in other fields and are a logical approach to address sensing data
integrity issues. They are not adequate for traditional SCADA. Standard crypto solutions
introduce a significant network and processing overhead that can interfere with the lowlatency operational requirement necessary to make real-time decisions. In general, previous
approaches introduce significant network overhead to RTUs that control field sensors at the
physical layer. Any little interference to the operation of critical RTUs from abnormal behavior or honest processes can cause loss of operational hours through prolonged outages,
breach of process data, and hardware/software components. Therefore, a lightweight approach to continuously verify sensing data flow integrity while ensuring that only trusted
field sensors are active in the systems must be devised.
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1.3

System Process Integrity Assurance

Due to the increasing security risks in ICPS systems, researchers have studied [23, 24, 11,
25, 26, 27] the runtime behavior state of field sensors. Traditional SCADA systems monitor
the State-of-Health (SoH) of physical constrained field devices. In general, the SoH of field
devices is used as an indicator to verify the physical process integrity of devices. Process
integrity attacks can potentially impact the constraints of physical devices by introducing different runtime state from honest control commands. Commonly, process integrity
attacks targeted [26] constrained field sensors that must follow sequential logical steps in
order to perform physical actions such as open or close a valve. The push-pull based legacy
communication of traditional ICPS never considers the consistency of field devices’ states
but rather takes the trustworthiness of processes and devices. However, without such process integrity assurance, malicious systems states could go unnoticed and potentially cause
an anomaly in state estimations tasks. An attacker can take advantage of the lack of robust
process integrity protocols to trigger incorrect states, e.g., an attacker can submit a control
command signal to turn on a pump without opening the valve first, causing the pump to
malfunction. To address process integrity attacks, modified Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDS) have been proposed [23, 24, 11, 25, 26, 27]. However, traditional SCADA systems
were not designed to monitor and record control command flow at the granularity associate
with state-of-art IDS. Therefore, a novel non-intrusive anomaly detection framework that
takes advantage of SCADA control programs’ push-pull based communication and incorporates continuous integrity checking of control data flow is critical to ensuring the security,
resilient, and high availability of legacy ICPS.
Considering the security threat and the state-of-art of devices and communication protocol of traditional ICPS. This work takes into consideration three main attributes that
ICPS must have in order to provide reliable service and robust security (1) ensure the integrity of sensing data flow from field sensors to SCADA masters, (2) continuous monitoring
of data control commands to confirm a proper sequential operation of all devices, and (3)
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continuously verify the identity of field sensors and other devices in order to guarantee that
only honest devices are in the network.

1.4

Next-generation Industrial CPS

In general, the security of legacy ICPS systems is ensured through network isolation [28]
and use of vendor-lock trusted devices. However, the emergence of more open and connected SCADA systems driven by the development of network-capable devices is pushing
towards the modernization of legacy SCADA [29]. Commonly, network-capable next-gen
IoT devices are self-governing heterogeneous devices that enable remote operators to monitor the SoH of the device easily. However, state-of-art centralized SCADA architectures
lack robust security mechanisms [30, 18] necessary to ensure process integrity and guarantee the devices’ identity. Although addressing the security issues of legacy centralized
ICPS while adopting next-gen devices is essential, it is also crucial to consider ICPS’s operational requirements, such as low latency, high availability, and real-time data access.
However, without robust authentication of devices provided by standard cryptography, ensuring the free flow of data and control commands from and to physical devices would not
be possible. Thus, traditional ICPS must adopt novel architectures and lightweight crypto
solutions suitable for both next-gen field devices and legacy devices like Remote Terminal
Units (RTUs) and SCADA masters. Adopting novel architectures and security mechanisms will enable continuous integrity validations and device attestation while complying
with state-of-art and future industry standards. Thus, it is acknowledged that a comprehensive and lightweight approach that addresses legacy security vulnerabilities of ICPS
and is suitable for embedded devices while it complies with current and future operational
industry standards must be devised.
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1.5

Thesis Organization

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, presents a detailed description
of previous works in the field of identity management and system process integrity assurance. We describe the current efforts from stakeholders to develop lightweight resilient
frameworks suitable for constrained field devices and ICPS. Chapter 3 discusses the security challenges of constrained field devices, specially the security issues to achieve robust
authentication and data integrity streams. The BloSPAI protocol discussed in Chapter 3
offloads the complexity of state-of-art crypto solutions by integrating lightweight hardware
security mechanisms PUFs that are use to generate unique and unclonable fingerprints for
field sensors. Furthermore the BloSPAI protocol integrates a distributed ledger platform to
ensure non-repudiation and fault tolerance of sensing transactions. Chapter 4 discusses a
Model-based Runtime State Verification (MBRSV) protocol that addresses false sequential
attacks while providing a heterogeneous system process integrity assurance framework for
ICPS. Legacy ICPS ecosystems integrate proprietary communication protocols that are
not suitable for tracking runtime-system-states at the high degree of granularity needed by
state-of-art Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The MBRSV protocol introduces a novel
behavior-based Mandatory Results Autonoma (MRA) that leverages the behavior-based
communication of the Modbus protocol to provide runtime state verification assurance.
Chapter 4 also introduces a novel Reinforcement Learning-based Runtime-system-state Integrity (RRI) framework, that do not rely in prior knowledge or existing system model. The
DRI framework demonstrate the performance and accuracy of state-of-art Reinforcement
Learning (RL) methods that implement trail and error mechanisms to devise the underlying
mechanisms of complex systems such as ICPS. In Chapter 5, we describe a High-Fidelity
Testbed (HFT) that aims to provide a prototype capability to address the rapid growth of
cyber attacks on traditional ICPS. In addition, the flexible capabilities of the HFT can be
leveraged to evaluate novel solutions to address cyber attacks. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes
and provides future directions that plan as an extension to this thesis.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In general, SCADA systems found in ICPS monitor the production [2] of 48% of the total
electricity produced in the U.S. Due to being designed to work isolated using proprietary
communication protocols, SCADA lacks proper security and authentication mechanisms
that introduce standard cyber attacks [31], such as data manipulation, identity spoofing,
replay attacks, and DoS attacks to SCADA architectures. The National Institute and
Technology (NIST) [32] established a program that has three security objectives to ensure
the operational hours and security of SCADA: (1) Network Protection, (2) Authentication
and Authorization, and (3) Secure Communications Protocols. Addressing security vulnerabilities demands novel and robust security frameworks suitable for constrained field
devices. To have a comprehensive study of previous efforts that addressed security vulnerabilities in SCADA, this Chapter groups previous works into three categories: (i) Device
Authentication, (ii) Sensing Data Flow Integrity, and (iii) Control Data Verification.

2.1

Device Authentication

Traditional SCADA systems lack robust authentication security mechanisms [33] to ensure
the identity of constrained field devices. Even more, the advent of modern network-capable
communication protocols exposed the security vulnerabilities of these constrained devices to
open communication protocols like the Internet. Commonly, identifying and authenticating
persons and things is achieved through standard crypto solutions such as cryptography that
can generate unique identities through secret keys. State-of-art crypto solutions, in general, assume Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to store secrets necessary to enable robust
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Figure 2.1: State-of-art PUF-based Authentication
authentication protocols securely. Although TPMs offer system-wide security solutions,
previous research [34, 35] has demonstrated several security vulnerabilities. Therefore,
industry, government, and academic researchers have proposed alternative lightweight authentication protocols that do not rely on TPMs.
Previous work [20, 21, 22] have integrated lightweight hardware security primitives that
map challenges and responses, namely, Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs). In general,
PUFs act as a hardware fingerprint generator. They are used to authenticate constrained
devices through dynamic secret key generation protocols. For example, Figure 2.1 illustrates a state-of-art PUF-based protocol to authenticate constrained devices.
A generic PUF-based authentication protocol proposed in [14] uses a challenge-response
pair from the PUF mechanism to derive a public-private keys pair by Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Although the PUF-based protocol introduces significant overhead, the implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography is necessary to address cybersecurity attacks
such as MITM attacks. In [36] authors proposed a PUF-based protocol vulnerable to standard MITM attacks. Most PUF-based protocols use the hardware mechanism to construct
a pair of public-private keys, which are then used to secure the communication between devices. Although PUF-based authentication protocols can address the lack of TPMs, their
integration introduces new challenges, such as managing and storing challenge-response
pairs (CRPs). To address the overhead of PUF mechanisms in terms of space complexity.
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Authors in [37] introduced an authentication and key exchange protocol that implements
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) and Key-ed Hash Functions. The key exchange protocol
aims to alleviate the footprint of CRPs at the verifier. The PUF-based protocol introduced
by Chatterjee assumes an honest resourceful device that resides in a close and trusted
network on which administrators perform all confidential operations and management of
CRPs of enrolled PUF-enabled devices.
PUF-based mechanisms have high applicability in SCADA. In general, PUF-based
mechanisms integrate unclonable and lightweight mechanisms. PUF-based protocols can
help to achieve robust authentication and continuous attestation through hardware fingerprinting. However, previous work integrates costly crypto solutions such as Elliptic Curve
Cryptography, which are unsuitable for SCADA low-latency and real-time operational requirements. A lightweight approach to reducing the footprint of costly crypto operations
is presented by Feng [15]. The lightweight attestation and authentication overcome the
drawback of standard crypto solutions through the integration checksum and signing mechanisms. To reduce the dependency of extensive enrollment phases, the protocol uses only
two PUF CRPs. Feng’s lightweight protocol is implemented in memory-based PUF mechanisms that provide unique responses and reduce the adversary resources through random
memory filling. In [16] the authors proposed an SRAM-based PUF protocol that generates a shared key to encrypt/decrypt transmitted data. This SRAM-based PUF protocol
defined a software-based approach to generate a shared key between provers and verifiers.
The PUF protocol generates an AES-256 shared key to encrypt all communication through
COTS SRAMs and Error Correction Codes.
Addressing State-of-art Challenges
This research work leverages a distributed ledger to offload the operational and network
overheads associated with RTUs to achieve lightweight SRAM-based PUF authentication
while preventing cloning attacks and achieving data flow integrity. Commonly, the security
of field devices depends on the availability of centralized device devices such as SCADA
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master. The proposed approach in this dissertation eliminates the complex crypto solutions
that add significant overhead to the system while maintaining robust security.

2.2

Sensing Data Flow Integrity

In general, real-world architectures need to handle some degree of data corruption during
transmission. Thus, it is challenging to achieve 100% error-free data transmissions. However, from a cybersecurity standpoint, SCADA systems need to ensure all sensing data’s
integrity during transmission and at the origin. Therefore, stakeholders have proposed
[38, 39, 40] mechanisms to provide a secure and robust sensing data flow. In [39], the
authors proposed an approach to detect data modification attacks on SCADA systems
in power grids. The proposed approach utilizes the already available measures from synchrophasors to measure the bus voltage and phase angle to enable dynamic state estimation
that increases the reliability of the systems by preventing damage to equipment and blackouts. Traditional SCADA systems have no downtime operational requirements, making
state-of-art Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) unreliable for the SCADA context. Authors
in [40] introduced an anomaly-based IDS (AbIDS) that identifies abnormal and malicious
usage through monitoring the behavior of physical devices in a multi-stage analyzer that
monitors and filters raw network packets. The AbIDS approach integrates user-defined
business rules that outline devices’ communication patterns. Another approach to address
the security vulnerabilities that impact sensing data’s integrity aims to address the security
vulnerabilities such as lack of robust integrity checks of standard communication protocols
like Modbus and DNP3 [41]. The DNP3 and Modbus protocol design did not concern
security features necessary, thus, introducing security threats such as data manipulation.
In [42], the authors proposed a modified version of the DNP3 protocol to secure data flow
transmission. The proposed DNP3 Secure Authentication (DNP3-SA) introduces security
mechanisms that integrate broadcast mode communications. The extended DNP3-SA protocol reused standard crypto solutions to address the security gaps of legacy DNP3 by
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integrating hash chains that help eliminate replay attacks and the necessity to use a unique
key on every message.

2.3

Control Data Verification

Besides the required sensing data to make critical operational decisions. Field sensors need
operational control data commands. Control data command flow generally refers to the
commands that a SCADA master sends to field sensors. These operational commands
determine the state and the physical operation that must be executed, e.g., an operational
command can increase the primary airflow of a boiler to increase combustion efficiency.
As described above, state-of-art communication protocols of traditional SCADA systems
transmit data in clear text and with zero security and integrity checks. The control data
flow in physical processes must follow a strict sequential logic that can cause physical
damage to field sensors if not executed in order. Therefore, SCADA systems must ensure
a sequential flow of operational commands. Due to the lack of robust security in SCADA
communication protocol. An adversary can intercept the communication flow of operational
commands and introduce false sequential logic attacks aiming to execute incorrect physical
device states. Thus, causing prolonged outages through emergency shutdowns due to the
device’s abnormal behavior.
State-of-art IDS are an effective approach [43] to prevent and detect abnormal behavior
of devices within a system. Although IDS have proved successful in different computer
science fields, they usually require detailed logging with a high degree of granularity of
the operations that need to be monitored. The high degree of granularity that makes IDS
effective is a roadblock in the SCADA context. In general, SCADA systems do not log the
necessary details of the device’s behavior and state to deploy a robust IDS properly. Securing the constrained devices in the physical layer of traditional SCADA systems demands
investment in novel frameworks that take advantage of SCADA behavior-based controls.
Previous work [27, 11, 26, 24, 44, 25] have mainly proposed two approaches: (1) runtime
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behavior-based frameworks and (2) machine learning models to address the challenges that
traditional SCADA systems face to monitor and detect abnormal behavior in constrained
devices.

2.3.1

Runtime behavior-based Framework

Previous work has proposed monitoring behavior-based frameworks that tap into field sensors’ communication flow and control devices like Remote Terminal Units (RTUs). A
monitoring approach [27] proposed a runtime verification (RTV) framework that detects
abnormal activities through semantic monitoring. The RTV approach considers a set of
finite sequences of the overall system’s states to monitor the execution of physical operations in a Siemens S7-1200 PLC through the Tempura monitor control systems that analyze
inputs and outputs to detect unusual operation requests. A slightly different behaviorbased framework proposed in [26] enforces CPS execution semantics through an eventaware Finite-state Automation (eFSA) model. The eFSA model utilizes an instantiation
of the anomaly detection framework, namely Orpheus [45, 46] which detects anomalous
control program behaviors caused by data-oriented attacks. Unlike the RTV approach,
the eFSA model particularly analyzes system calls and program counters in COTS controllers. In addition, the eFSA model monitors the state transition of memory address
information during normal execution and data-oriented attacks. The eFSA model provides
an insightful limitation of overall state-of-art IDS and event-aware frameworks on which
legacy controllers and field sensors are bare-metal devices, thus, limiting the execution of
frameworks that require operating system supports. Zheng in [24] proposed a non-intrusive
runtime verification framework that, like previous approaches, relies on the behavior-driven
specifications of SCADA systems. Zheng’s non-intrusive behavior provides real-world case
studies derived from behavior-driven development cycles that enable formal system and
device behavior specification using natural languages. The behavior-driven consists of a
synthesized event monitor controller that verifies the quantitative properties of timed automata. Behavior-driven runtime frameworks are generally used to address false sequential
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logic attacks in traditional SCADA systems. A false sequential logic attack exposes control
data flow to adversaries that can intercept the data and introduce rogue control commands
causing physical damage. In [11] authors proposed a systematic model to analyze the physical impacts of false sequential attacks in state-of-art SCADA devices. The system model
of false sequential attack provides an insightful understanding of the conditions and the
consequences of physical damage that successful, false sequential logic attacks can have.

2.3.2

Machine Learning Methods

A different approach to address the lack of data control flow integrity uses Machine Learning
(ML) models. Like previous approaches, an ML model analyzes the runtime behavior of
field sensors. For example, Stefeanidis et al. [25] proposed network-behavior-based anomaly
detection that exploits the unique traffic characteristics of the Operational Technology (OT)
network. Through the Hidden Markov Model’s adoption, Stefeanidis designed an anomaly
detection framework that categorizes Modbus protocol traffic attributes to identify field
sensors’ runtime state. Another ML model proposed in [44] addressed false sequential
logic attacks through a condition monitoring system that takes advantage of operation
data and alarm logs in legacy SCADA systems. In particular, the ML model proposed in
[44] analyzes the temperature signal to assess wind turbines’ operational status. The ML
model’s performance was evaluated in wind turbine data recorded from SCADA systems
in Sweden. It was mainly focused on the gearbox component.
Even though several proposed approaches have addressed crucial security vulnerabilities
in SCADA systems, the recent development of communication technologies and networkcapable field sensors pushes a modernization of legacy SCADA systems to adopt new standards and communication protocols suitable for next-gen devices.
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Addressing State-of-art Challenges
Previous approaches have addressed security vulnerabilities and process integrity challenges
through IDS and ML models in specific ecosystems representing a small part of heterogeneous ICS. However, addressing system process integrity assurance in heterogeneous ICS
ecosystems is still an open research challenge. In general, previous approaches to address
process integrity assurance challenges assumed a centralized architecture and limited the
scope of the systems only to consider specific system processes and devices. Besides the
limited scope, previous approaches do not fully take advantage of the behavior-based communication protocol already available in ICS ecosystems. This dissertation proposes a
system-agnostic behavior and model-based monitoring agent to generalize and maintain
the runtime system-states of system processes. We integrate behavior and model-based interoperable monitoring services. The novel behavior-and-model-based introduces dynamic
verification capable of addressing heterogeneous ICS ecosystems without having previous
knowledge of constrained field devices, constraints, behavior policies, systems, or operation
of processes.

2.4

Distributed Ledger-based SCADA Systems

Traditional SCADA architectures heavily rely on data acquisition processes to prevent and
detect unauthorized data manipulation by adversaries. Therefore, ensuring the integrity,
consistency, and security of the data acquisition process is critical for the operational constraints of SCADA. Centralized security solutions have been proposed [47, 48] to detect and
prevent unauthorized data manipulation. However, previous centralized solutions are vulnerable to a single point of failure attacks, i.e., an adversary can compromise the data flow
by attacking a single entity. Novel approaches [49, 50, 51] that aim to achieve data integrity
and high reliability through data replication, ledger-integrated nodes, and consensus algorithm have integrated distributed ledger technology into SCADA. ICS-BlockOpS proposed
in [49] provides data replication and redundancy to ensure historians’ devices’ integrity
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and availability at SCADA systems. ICS-BlockOpS proposed a decentralized historian
database that ensures data replication by integrating a Hadoop Distributed File System
(HDFS) and smart contracts deployed in the Ethereum network. The HDFS enforces smart
contract-based access policies that prevent unauthorized manipulation of data.
A data manipulation attack is commonly considered successful if an adversary tampers or replaces data packages during transmission or manipulates data locally at control
commands serves. In [50] authors propose a distributed blockchain-based data protection
framework that improves the security mechanisms of traditional SCADA systems. The
proposed data protection framework integrates an enhanced consensus algorithm that addresses the [52] challenges and security issues such as lack of scalability and high latency
of state-of-art consensus algorithms. The data protection framework evaluated through
the IEEE-118 benchmark demonstrated that as the number of needed manipulated data
increases, the probability of success for a given adversary decreases. Previous [49, 50] work
in blockchain-based SCADA systems considered traditional and legacy SCADA devices as
part of the distributed network. However, the recent development of network-capable devices is pushing for the modernization of SCADA. In [51] authors proposed PoRCH. PoRCH
is a novel consensus mechanism that aims to customize the selection of mining nodes to
improve the efficiency of data acquisition processes. The PoRCH consensus mechanisms
consider the operational requirements of next-gen network-capable devices to efficiently
customize a mining node based on the current load of all other mining nodes and the data
request flow of the device.

2.5

Emerging Challenges

In general traditional ICPS is evolving rapidly because of the development of more complex and network-capable field devices that perform a greater and more complex number
of tasks to monitor physical system processes. Although previous proposals [49, 50] have
achieved system-wide security solutions, they are still key problems that industry, gov-
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ernment, and researchers need to resolve before adopting new technologies and hardware
security solutions in traditional SCADA systems.

2.5.1

Industry 4.0

Network-capable sensors have enabled more open and interconnected SCADA systems by
integrating Industry 4.0 (I4.0), thus introducing new operational and security challenges.
Considering the limitation of traditional SCADA devices and the operational requirements
of I4.0, how can we enable a resilient SCADA architecture that integrates I4.0 capabilities
through next-gen IoT devices?
Industry 4.0 standards [53, 54] allow the majority of industrial devices to be interconnected using different communication technologies where they can have decentralized
control on identifying, locating, tracking, monitoring, and optimizing the industrial processes. I4.0 is characterized [54] for being highly flexible with a dynamic and constant
reconfiguration; it usually consists of a high degree of self-governing heterogeneous devices
that require novel approaches to address their communication, authentication, and overall
operation. Therefore, current SCADA systems lack security mechanisms for addressing
I4.0 operational requirements [28] and have limited interoperability as vendors’ lock-in prevents the free flow of data [55]. Emerging CPSs under I4.0 tend to adopt decentralized
communication architecture, which can enhance the autonomy and resiliency aspects of the
SCADA environment. Therefore, enabling a resilient hybrid SCADA architecture where
the existing centralized platform can be integrated with a P2P-based networking model for
the new generation devices that meet the I4.0 standard is critical.

2.5.2

Physically Unclonable Functions

In general, PUF-based authentication methods are not suitable for critical real-time systems such as SCADA because the reliability of the PUF mechanism degrades over time.
An authentication method based on PUF primitives could stand in consumer electronics
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applications, but it cannot respect industrial standards. Meaning there is a fundamental
lack of robustness when PUFs are used in authentication methods for SCADA applications.
Considering the limitation of PUF mechanisms, this highlights the following research question, how can we devise a high reliable PUF mechanism to comply with the operational
threshold of SCADA through the life cycle of a field sensor?
PUFs are used as low-cost fingerprint generators for constrained devices to address
security and performance challenges of public-key cryptography, such as distributed key
management challenges. As shown in Figure 2.2, PUFs are designed to map unique inputs
to outputs based on the physical attributes of hardware. PUFs are integrated as lightweight
security primitives in the SCADA context to enable unique and unclonable hardware fingerprints for field sensors. Even though many types of [56, 57] PUFs (e.g., Arbiter PUF,
XOR PUF) have been proposed in the past. Memory-based PUFs, such as SRAM-based
PUFs, are adopted in SCADA systems because of their high availability and performance
[58] of the SRAM microchips. However, a considerable robust [59] PUF mechanism must
have the following security properties (1) an unpredictable output, (2) unclonable, and (3)
depend on the physical structure of the hardware. The key differences between PUF-based
mechanisms and cryptographic hash functions are worth mentioning. Without loss of generality, a hash function is a one-way function that digests a stream of bits and outputs a
unique and random stream of bits. The unique aspect of both PUF mechanisms and hash
functions are appealing in the ICS context. This thesis aims to integrate robust PUF mechanisms through lightweight hash functions suitable for embedded devices. Implementing
only hash functions or PUF mechanisms is insufficient to achieve robust security.
Even though PUF mechanisms can offload the complexity of state-of-art crypto solutions
and addresses key management challenges for embedded sensors, they have instability issues
due to environmental noise and aging that must be addressed to achieve a robust and
stable implementation. Previous research focused on the stability of SRAM-based PUF
and proposed [60, 61, 62] aging and environmental noise mitigation through the selection of
strong cells in the SRAM. In general, the selection of strong cells in SRAM microchips assets
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Figure 2.2: Traditional PUF mechanism

the reliability, stability, and reproducibility of the individual physical cells over an extended
period and under diverse environments such as different voltages and temperatures. Thus,
improving the reproducibility, and reliability of SRAM-based PUF mechanisms is crucial
for the operational and security characteristics of PUF-based protocols.

2.6

Summary

Although the modernization of SCADA systems through more open and connected networks has introduced significant advantages in terms of processing capabilities and system reliability, it has also exposed legacy security vulnerabilities of state-of-art SCADA
communication protocols and constrained devices to adversaries that can exploit such vulnerabilities to introduce rogue devices into the systems, exposing critical components to
self-damaging devices and compromising confidential business information. Cyber attacks
on traditional SCADA architectures have demonstrated the catastrophic consequences that
prolonged outages can create to society’s sustainability. Therefore, it is crucial for the indus-

25

try, researchers, and government entities to address the security vulnerabilities of SCADA
systems, commonly found in national critical infrastructures. In this Chapter, we discussed
the importance of addressing the security vulnerabilities of SCADA. We presented recent
developments in industry and research in terms of (1) sensor identification, (2) integrity
sensing data flow, and (3) verification of control data. Even though considerable efforts have
developed robust frameworks and platforms that address some security vulnerabilities of
SCADA systems, there are still open research issues that prevent the adoption of next-gen
communication protocols and standards such as I4.0. Thus, we discuss the open-researches
challenges that significantly impact the adoption of novel cybersecurity mechanisms that
prevent standard cyber attacks.
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Chapter 3
Achieving Sensor Identification and
Data Flow Integrity in SCADA
With the emergence of modern network-capable sensor technology, ensuring the cyberidentity of field sensors in ICPS has become a prime research challenge, as it impacts
society’s sustainability. Commonly, field sensors monitor crucial physical aspects and other
devices’ State-of-Health (SoH) in the critical national infrastructure through open networks
such as the Internet. The majority of existing ICPS depend on legacy Modbus protocol
[12] designed to provide networking ability among trusted and honest devices, which does
not care about devices’ identity verification. An adversary can exploit common security
threats, such as broken authentication, to introduce rogue devices. State-of-art crypto
solutions have been proven to be efficient in providing system-wide security solutions that
prevent standard cyber attacks such as identity spoofing. However, because of their high
overhead and digital footprint, standard crypto solutions do not necessarily guarantee the
operational needs of traditional ICPS.
Traditional crypto algorithms depend on secret keys used to protect data communication from adversaries and unauthorized users. Commonly, standard cryptography requires
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) to store the secret keys securely. Therefore, the
management of these secret keys is crucial for achieving robust security and resilient authentication protocols. Although secret key management approaches have demonstrated
system-wide security solutions in resourceful systems, they introduce additional challenges
[63] to centralized ICPS systems that mainly consist of constrained devices. Therefore,
lightweight hardware security primitives, like PUFs, that can be used as low-cost finger-

27

print generators must be leveraged to devise a continuous lightweight device authentication
framework suitable for constrained devices.
This chapter describes the SRAM PUF Authentication and Integrity (SPAI) protocol
[64] and the blockchain-based SRAM PUF Authentication and Integrity (BloSPAI) protocol
[65]. Due to the high availability and efficient performance of SRAM microchips in IoT
devices, the SPAI protocol assumes SRAM-enabled field sensors. The SRAM-based PUF
mechanism is then used as a hardware fingerprint generator to derive unique and unclonable
identities for each device in a study case of power generation plants commonly monitored
by SCADA systems. Thus, the SPAI protocol offloads the complexity of crypto solutions
from constrained controllers. In contrast, the BloSPAI protocol offloads the processing
overheads of controllers to a resourceful distributed ledger platform. Overall, both protocols
aim to eliminate rogue sensor devices through continuous authentication and attestation
of constrained field devices.

3.1

System Model

State-of-art Purdue Model [10] of SCADA systems consist of three major zones (i) Enterprise Zone, (ii) Industrial Demilitarized Zone (IDMZ), and (iii) Industrial Zone. Authors in
[10] generalized three security threats that can potentially impact each zone’s cyber-secure
operation. (1) Confidentiality attacks could gain unauthorized data from SCADA masters
in the industrial zone. (2) Data flow attacks could target the IDMZ through a DoS attack,
disrupting the communication between field sensors and the SCADA master. (3) Data
integrity attacks could introduce rogue information to industrial operations, commonly
maintained by RTUs and field sensors.
Figure 3.1 illustrates a simplified overview of the communication between the SCADA
master, the RTU, and a field sensor. This Chapter assumes that the communication channel
between SCADA master and RTU is trusted and secure. Usually, the SCADA master sends
requests to the RTU to pull information from a given field sensor or to send operational
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commands like a shutdown command [12]. Protecting against spoofing the identity of
RTU is outside the scope of this Chapter. This Chapter mainly focuses on achieving
authenticated communication between RTU and field sensors. In regular operation, the
RTU sends a command to the field sensor, and the sensor may or may not send data back
to the RTU.

Pull Data
SCADA request

RTU

Master

Field Sensor
Pull Data
request
Data

Figure 3.1: Process of Data Pulling from Field Sensors (Modbus)

RTU
(verifier)

SCADA
Master

Data
request

CRDB

(1)

Pull Data
Request, CRP
Signature, Data,
Hash(Data)

PUF

(2)

Field Sensor
(prover)
Figure 3.2: Simplified Process of Data Pulling from Field Sensors (SPAI)
Figure 3.2 illustrates simplified data exchange between SCADA devices integrating the
SPAI protocol. The RTU (verifier) initially sends a pull data request to the field sensor
(prover). Next, the verifier sends a challenge-response pair (CRP) fetched from a secure
Challenge-Response Database (CRDB) along with the data request. The prover will use the
CRP to generate a unique response through the embedded SRAM-based PUF mechanism.
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The prover then reads the pull data request and gets the sensor data. However, before
sending the data back to the verifier, the prover needs to attach a unique signature and
the hash of the data. Next, before forwarding the field sensor data to the SCADA master,
the verifier first validates the sensor’s identity and then the data’s integrity.

3.1.1

Security Threats

To have a more comprehensive classification of the SCADA security threats, this Chapter
classifies the NIST’s security objectives into three categories: (1) Privacy attacks, (2)
Data Integrity attacks, and (3) Data Flow attacks. Data flow is defined as the stream of
information that gets from field sensors to the SCADA master. Data integrity refers to
the state of the data. It is considered that the data stream is private, and only authorized
devices in the SCADA system can view and manipulate the data.
• Data Flow Attacks: This type of attack targets the capability of a SCADA master
to access the information gathered by field sensors. A malicious user can potentially
deploy a DoS attack to one RTU, disrupting communication between field sensors
and the SCADA master.
• Confidential Attacks: These attacks aim to obtain unauthorized data from field
sensors or any other critical information like passwords or configuration from the
SCADA master or RTUs.
• Data Integrity Attacks: Field sensors continuously gather data from their environment, which is then sent to the automatic control layer over analog signals to
RTUs or PLCs. RTUs transform the analog signals of a field sensor into digital signals that are then forwarded to the MTUs. Malicious users can intercept the data
and modify it to represent a false state of the SCADA system, or they can fabricate
fake data disrupting the flow of data and operations of the overall system. In these
attacks, an adversary could potentially intercept and modify data from field sensors,

30

introducing rogue data to the SCADA ecosystems, thus exposing critical components
to Stuxnet-type [5] attacks that can send damage-inducing commands.

3.2

SRAM-based PUF Authentication and Integrity
protocol

Due to the lack of robust security mechanisms of SCADA systems, an adversary could introduce rogue devices that could potentially impact the cyber-secure operation of SCADA.
This Chapter introduces the SPAI protocol, which aims to address the spoofing of field
sensors’ data and identity through a unique fingerprint derived from an SRAM-based PUF
mechanism.
Previous PUF protocols implement complex crypto and non-crypto solutions such as Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Error Correction Codes (ECC), and multiple challenge-response
pairs. Such solutions are not suitable for the limited capabilities of field sensors and the low
latency requirement of SCADA systems. Therefore, this Chapter describes the three-phase
single pair SPAI protocol that removes complex crypto solutions overhead. The SPAI protocol has three major components: (1) the SCADA master, (2) the verifier(s), and (3) the
prover(s). The SPAI protocol assumes that prover(s) and verifier(s) reside at the physical
and automatic control layers, respectively. The field sensors that play the prover(s) role are
SRAM-based PUF enabled and constrained devices. The verifier(s) are resourceful devices
and can control multiple field sensors.
The SPAI protocol works in three phases, (1) the profiling phase, (2) the enrollment
phase, and (3) the authentication phase. The SPAI protocol assumes a secured and trusted
environment in which the profiling and the enrollment phase are executed. The profiling
phase identifies the strongest cells in the SRAM, while the enrollment phase generates
unique responses for each embedded SRAM-based PUF mechanism. The pair of unique
challenges and responses are stored in a CRDB at the verifier. In the authentication phase,
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the verifier selects two random tuples for a field sensor. The sensor is authenticated if the
field sensor regenerates the correct response. The SPAI protocol eliminates standard cyber
attacks such as DoS attacks and replays attacks by implementing timestamps that help the
verifier keep track of active requests.

3.2.1

Profiling Phase

A PUF consists of two unique components (1) a challenge and (2) a response. In the SRAM
context, a challenge represents a cell’s location, and the response represents the bit value
stored in the location. The bit value of each cell can not be guaranteed throughout the
life cycle of the SRAM. Due to the volatility of SRAMs’ responses, ECCs are needed to
correct errors and generate stable responses [58]. Through preliminary experiments, it is
acknowledged that the overhead of ECCs, although negligible for previous PUF protocols,
has significant overhead in the SCADA context. The SPAI protocol avoids the overhead of
ECCs by introducing a profiling phase that categorizes the SRAM’s behavior. The SRAM
profiling allows the prover to identify the strongest cells in the SRAM, thus eliminating
the necessity of ECCs. The SPAI protocol identifies stable cells through a data remanence
algorithm [62], which through 1,000 power-up tests, preliminary experiments acquired 2,000
stable cells of a 128Kb SRAM with both 1s and 0s values. From the 2,000 stable cells 75%
are stable ’1s’ and 35% are stable ’0s’. The number of stable cells and the percentage of ones
and zeros can be determined during the data remanence algorithm implementation. The
profiling phase then selects the cells that flipped their value in the shortest time (300ms).

3.2.2

Enrollment Phase

In this step, the SPAI protocol generates and stores a CRP required to authenticate a field
sensor. The steps are the following:
1. The verifier gets a challenge getChallenge(sBits, Ca ).
2. The verifier appends the challenge CRDB.append(Ca ).
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3. Once the challenge Ca is generated, the verifier sends it through secure channels to the
prover. During the enrollment phase, confidential information is exchanged, because
of the critical nature of the information secure transmission channels are necessary.
4. Using the addresses in the challenge, the prover reads the bit value [0, 1] that is stored
in the SRAM, creating a response Ra = getP U F (Ca ).
5. The prover sends (through secure channels) hRa i to the verifier. The response must
be kept secret if the attacker access this response. They can spoof the identity of the
prover and eventually compromise the SCADA system and the SPAI protocol.
6. Finally, the verifier appends the response to the CRDB using CRDB.append(Ra ).
The enrollment phase outputs the tuple hCa , Ra i stored in the secure CRDB. Considering that the SPAI protocol can repeat the enrollment phase as the storage capacity of
the verifier allows. Preliminary experiments used 2,000 stable cells for evaluation. The
SPAI protocol implements a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) function
to ensure the integrity of data flow. The enrollment phase in the preliminary experiments
set the challenge and response length to 256 bits. Considering the 256 bits setup, the SPAI
protocol can generate 5 × 10330 usable hC, Ri tuples.

3.2.3

Authentication Phase

The authentication phase ensures the authenticity of requests and data flow integrity. The
communication between verifier(s) and prover(s) can be over unsecured channels during
this phase. Due to the properties of the SRAM-based PUF mechanism, lightweight crypto
solutions, and the amount of information transmitted, the identity and security of all
components in the systems will remain protected even if adversaries intercept part or all
transmitted data. The authentication phase, as shown in Figure 3.3 has three steps (1),
setup, (2) generate response, and (3) authenticate prover and verify data integrity.
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Figure 3.3: SPAI Protocol Authentication phase
Algorithm 1: setup
Require: Access to CRDB
1:

R1 , C1 = getT uple(prover)

2:

T S = time() // keep track of active requests

3:

H1 = HM AC(R1 , C1 ||T S)

4:

T S 0 = T S ⊕ hash(R1 )

5:

respSensor = authP rover(C1 , T S 0 , H1 )

The first step shown in Algorithm 1 initialize the required information to send a request
to a field sensor. T S 0 helps to obfuscate the timestamp used for preventing replay attacks,
and since only the verifier and prover have legit access to the CRDB and SRAM-based
PUF mechanism, the hash of the current session represented as H1 is used to verify both
identities verifier and prover.
The second step shown in Algorithm 2 is executed in the field sensor. In this step, the
field sensor verifies the authenticity of the request. Then through the SRAM-based PUF
mechanism, it creates a hash-key function used to preserve the integrity of the sensing data.
On the third step shown in Algorithm 3, the verifier first receives a response from the
prover. Then it can start validating the identity and data. This begins by measuring the
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Algorithm 2: getResponse
Require: Access to SRAM-based PUF mechanism
1:

C1 , H1 , T S 0 = readRequest()

2:

R1 = getP U F (C1 )

3:

T S = T S 0 ⊕ hash(R1 )

4:

H11 = HM AC(R1 , C1 ||T S)

5:

if H11 ! = H1 then

6:

exit

7:

end if

8:

data = readSensor()

9:

H2 = HM AC(R1 , data) // ensure data integrity

10:

responseSensor =< data, H2 >

11:

return responseSensor

time taken to generate the unique identity; the execution time of the prover must be within
a threshold of time ∆t. The verifier only forwards the request to the SCADA master if the
prover is successfully authenticated and the integrity of the sensing data is preserved.
It is essential to consider that the number of CRDB entries and the frequency of requests
from SCADA master(s) will determine the period of re-enrollment. If the verifier(s) can
successfully authenticate the prover, the pair of tuples used during the authentication
phase are discarded. Forcing the verifier to use new tuples on every iteration eliminates
the possibility of replay attacks at the cost of performance. To have a comprehensive
evaluation of the SPAI protocol, it is essential to analyze its resistance against known
security vulnerabilities.
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Algorithm 3: verifyResponse
1: data, H2 = unpack(respSensor)
2:

t2 = time() // keep track of active requests

3:

H22 = HM AC(R1 , data)

4:

if t2 − T S > ∆t then

5:
6:

exit
else if H2 ! = H22 then // verify data integrity & verifier identity

7:

exit

8:

end if

9:

Device is Authenticated

10:

3.3

sendT oSCADA(data)

Blockchain-based SRAM PUF Authentication and
Integrity Protocol

Lack of appropriate security mechanisms expose SCADA systems to a broad range of cyber
attacks [19, 66] that can potentially introduce rogue devices into the SCADA ecosystem.
The BloSPAI protocol aims to achieve (1) resilient and reliable sensor data flow through a
distributed ledger and smart contracts, and (2) eliminate rogue device through the SPAI
protocol [64].
The BloSPAI protocol as shown in Figure 3.4 consists of three major phases: (1) profiling
phase, (2) enrollment phase, and (3) authentication phase. The profiling identifies the most
robust cells in the SRAM through a data remanence algorithm [62]. In the second phase,
the prover (RTU) queries an enrollment smart contract, which creates a digital object in
the HLF network. Next, the RTU queries a second smart contract at the authentication
phase that handles data integrity and sensor validation. To conclude the data process flow,
the RTU forwards the sensor data to a SCADA master only if the HLF network successfully
validates the integrity of the data and the field sensor’s identity.
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Figure 3.4: BloSPAI sequence diagram
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3.4

Security Analysis

This section discusses the security risk and strengths of introducing a distributed ledger to
the SPAI protocol and analyzes four critical components that can be vulnerable to cyber
attacks (i) RTUs, (ii) communication link, (iii) blockchain peer, and (iv) PUFs. The security of field sensors [64] is addressed through the previous implementation of the standalone
SPAI protocol. Besides addressing the shortcomings of the SPAI protocol, the BloSPAI
protocol described in this Chapter also enhances the security attributed to previous SPAI
implementation by integrating a distributed network such as the HLF network. Preliminary experiments of the BloSPAI protocol demonstrate prevention of MITM attack and
its efficiency against state-of-art cyber attacks. The following discussion addresses what
security attributes the BloSPAI introduces to SCADA ecosystems, and how these security
characteristics prevent standard active/passive cyber attacks such as DoS, sniffing, etc.

3.4.1

Remote Terminal Unit Security

The availability of RTUs is a critical objective for the overall reliability and accessibility of
sensor data, even a slight disruption can cause catastrophic outages. In general, preventing
DoS attacks at the protocol level is challenging. However, to prevent DoS attacks, the
BloSPAI protocol leverages timestamps that RTUs use to keep track of active sessions.
By tracking actives sessions, RTUs in the BloSPAI protocol can limit the number of data
requests they need to process. It is assumed that SCADA masters and field sensors can
have only one active session at any time. Thus, any attempt from adversaries to overload
the processing capacity of RTUs will fail because the BloSPAI protocol verifies if the RTU
needs to respond or not by checking the last timestamp.

3.4.2

Communication Link Security

Complying with the operational threshold of SCADA systems, such as low-latency is essential. Data transmitted over the Modbus and BloSPAI protocol is sent in clear text,
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meaning that any malicious user can eavesdrop on the communication between (1) verifiers, (2) provers, and (3) blockchain peers. Rather than fixing the security vulnerabilities
[67] of SCADA systems such as lack of authentication the BloSPAI protocol through the implementation of continuous authentication, integrity validation, and consensus algorithms
ensures the system’s overall security even when malicious users compromise partial or full
messages.
To analyze how the authentication protocol prevent attacks, consider that an attacker
intercepts the first tuple sent by blockchain peer hC1 , H1 , T S 0 i, after getting the tuple, the
attacker may attempt two things. First, the attacker can attempt to initiate a replay request
from an RTU. However, an RTU can detect if the field sensor requested by the attacker
already has an active request. Thus, the RTU will reject the rogue request. Second, an
attacker may attempt to respond directly to the blockchain peer with a rogue field sensor
response. We describe the steps the attackers needs to generate a rogue response and how
the BloSPAI protocol prevents the attack.
1. For the attacker to spoof the field sensor’s identity and compromise the data integrity,
it needs to generate H2 . To generate H2 , the attacker needs to know R1 .
2. The first step is then to generate R1 . To achieve this, the attacker needs an SRAM
that given C1 can produce R1 = getP U F (C1 ). As discussed in the previous subsection, there is no feasible process that can create two identical SRAMs. To correctly
generate R1 , the attacker must use the same SRAM that is embedded in the field
sensor.
3. Since the attacker cannot accurately generate R1 . Any attempt to send a rogue
response to the HLF network will result in unsuccessful authentication.

3.4.3

Blockchain Peer Security

It is identified that a major vulnerability in PUF-based protocols is modeling attacks [68],
which attempt to predict each possible response of the PUF mechanism. The BloSPAI
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protocol tries to prevent modeling attacks by implementing a distributed ledger on which
critical information such as CRP is stored in multiple copies of blockchain peers. The
authentication smart contract in the HLF network prevents unauthorized access to the
CRP, meaning only the original RTU that enrolled the field sensor can request a CRP from
the distributed ledger. Blockchain peers’ security is ensured through the security attributes
of permissioned blockchain [69].
Although the PUF mechanism eliminates rogue devices from the SCADA architecture,
an attacker can still access the field sensor’s state, for the experimental scenario, the temperature of a boiler room. The BloSPAI protocol prevents the unauthorized modification
of sensor data through Keyed-hash Message Authentication Code functions. However, if
an adversary has enough resources to monitor all field sensors in the SCADA system, it
can derive confidential information related to the capabilities, overall state, and behavior.

3.4.4

Challenge-Response Pair Security

The BloSPAI protocol integrates a distributed HLF network on which each blockchain peer
keeps a local copy of the CRPs. The ability to regulate who may join the HLF network and
access to the distributed ledger is the most important feature of permissioned blockchain.
Transactions in the ledger don’t have to be visible to everyone, and complete openness isn’t
essential. Hence, the BloSPAI protocol delegates the security assurance of CRPs to the
distributed HLF network and its security features.

3.4.5

Physically Unclonable Functions Security

The BloSPAI protocol implements unique lightweight security PUFs primitive [70]. Used
as low-cost fingerprint generators for all field sensors in the SCADA systems. PUFs are
designed to map unique inputs to outputs based on the physical structure of a device. A
considerable robust PUF mechanism [59] must achieve the following properties (1) an unpredictable output, (2) unclonable, and (3) depend on the physical structure of the device.
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Although many types of PUFs have been proposed [56, 71], the BloSPAI protocol integrates a memory-based PUF, namely SRAM PUFs because of its wide use and performance
[72]. Due to the high availability and high performance of SRAMs, the BloSPAI protocol
leverages the integration of SRAM-based PUFs realized in our previous SPAI protocol to
generate low-cost hardware fingerprint for each field sensor. In general, SRAM-based PUFs
are widely available in Commercial-Of-The-Shelf (COTS) sensors. The following characteristics of SRAM microchips are behind our motivation to envision the BloSPAI protocol: (i)
stand-alone component, i.e., available outside embedded devices, (ii) relative low cost, (iii)
large memory size. Even though the PUF mechanism implemented in the BloSPAI protocol offloads the complexity of state-of-art crypto solutions for the embedded field sensors,
they have several challenges that must be addressed to achieve a robust implementation.
In general, PUFs primitives suffer from environmental noise and aging deterioration [61],
which can significantly impact the reliability and overall robustness of PUFs primitives.
Previous work [73, 60] have proposed mitigation schemes to reduce aging and improve the
reliability of SRAM-based PUFs. The BloSPAI protocol ensures the stability of the PUF
mechanism [72] through a data remanence algorithm that identifies the most robust cells
in the SRAM microchip.

3.5

Results and Discussion

This section describes the experimental setup and analyze the performance of the BloSPAI
protocol through an emulated SCADA systems with two RTUs pulling temperature data
from a DHT11 sensor.

3.5.1

Testbed Setup

As shown in Figure 3.5 the emulated SCADA environment consist of four Raspberry pi
3 model B platforms and a DELL Precision 7530. Two of the Raspberry pi were used
to simulated RTUs connected to external SRAM microchips 23LC1024, with a capacity
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Figure 3.5: Experiment Setup
of 128K bits. To evaluate the BloSPAI protocol’s overhead, COTS DHT11 temperature
and humidity sensors are integrated. Each DTH11 sensor has the capacity to read and
transmit the temperature every two seconds. The preliminary evaluations of the BloSPAI
protocol assumed a stable environment where external factors do not impact the long-term
reliability of SRAM-based PUFs. Since previous [73, 60] works have analyzed the longterm performance of SRAM-based PUFs in a diverse set of environments, the evaluation
presented assumes that preventive measures to ensure relatively stable environments have
been put in place. Thus, with this assumption PUF-enabled field sensors will operate in
controlled environments.
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Figure 3.6: Men-in-the-Middle Attack Scenario

3.5.2

Attack Scenario

To have a comprehensive evaluation of the BloSPAI protocol’s efficiency a MITM attack
illustrate in Figure 3.6 is emulated in the SCADA testbed. Assuming the attacker has
unrestricted access to the communication channel between all three parties (1) HLF network, (2) RTU, and (3) Field Sensor. First, we discuss the attack scenario without the
BloSPAI protocol. In this context, an attacker can eavesdrop on the data exchange between
RTUs and field sensors. Since the design of SCADA state-of-art communication protocols
does not consider security as a significant concern, the attacker can intercept and modify
any message in the channel. Thus, the attacker can successfully send rogue data such
as damage-inducing commands. Second, we discuss the implementation of the BloSPAI
protocol. Like before, the attacker has unrestricted access to the communication channel.
However, to succeed in sending rogue data, the attacker also needs to re-create the prover’s
signing mechanism. Due to the statistical variation in SRAMs production, the attacker
cannot reproduce the PUF mechanism embedded in the field sensor.
Through the MITM attacks simulation, we noticed a slight increase in the SCADA
emulation’s overall performance compared to a raw Modbus implementation. We observe
that the small increase is mostly due to the necessary security features integrated by the
BloSPAI protocol.
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3.5.3

Evaluation Setup

The comparative evaluation considers four protocols: (a) state-of-art PUF protocol [37], (b)
raw Modbus protocol, (c) standalone SPAI protocol [64], and (d) BloSPAI protocol. This
Chapter, discusses the performance of PUF-based protocol in two categories (1) overhead
to process a data request and (2) overall performance of the blockchain network. Table 3.1
illustrate the performance of all four protocol while processing a single data request from
the DHT11 sensor.
Table 3.1: Preliminary experiment results
Protocol

Transmission

Transmitted

Time

Data

Raw Modbus

20ms

857 Bytes

SPAI Protocol

194ms

2675 Bytes

BloSPAI Protocol

218ms

2527 Bytes

379ms

5483 Bytes

State-of-art
PUF protocol [37]

3.5.4

Hyperledger Fabric Network Setup

Our evaluation setup envisioned in this dissertation integrates an out-of-the-box Hyperledger Fabric network as illustrated in Figure 3.7. The physical SCADA simulation leverage a Hyperledger Fabric v2.2 consisting of two anchor peers, six peer nodes, and one
orderer peer. Through the comprehensive evaluation of the BloSPAI protocol, we assumed
a standard operation of traditional SCADA ecosystems in terms of data sensor flow. Field
sensors and RTUs exchange information over the Modbus protocol. And the rest of the
HLF network use state-of-art TCP/IP communication. Our physical test base is limited
to the operational capabilities of the COTS DHT11 sensors. Thus, our SCADA test base
has a minimum rate of two seconds per sensor read. Both smart contracts, enrollment
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Figure 3.7: HLF network setup for BloSPAI evaluation
smart contract, and verification smart contract are deployed in all blockchain peers. To
successfully verify each field sensor, we replicated the verification smart contract logic at
each field sensor. By replicating the verification code at the field sensors, the BloSPAI
protocol achieves a standard operation across different devices.
As illustrated in Figure 3.7, field sensors have direct communication to RTUs. RTUs receive state-of-art Modbus communication, which is then parsed to capture the necessary information to verify the device’s identity and validate the integrity of its data through smart
contracts. Smart contracts and the overall HLF network were deployed in go. Therefore,
RTUs leverage an application used to translate native Modbus data to a common language that modern HLF peers can parse. Due to the limitations in terms of processing
capabilities of field sensors all HLF-related activities are done through resourceful devices,
which can support a full integration of smart contracts and HLF applications. Our envisioned HLF network integrates two main smart contracts, enrollment smart contracts and
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authentication smart contracts. Both smart contracts are deployed in Go programming
language. RTUs communicate through these smart contracts through RESTful API that
exposes interfaces to send and receive sensor data. To illustrate the functionality of our
smart contracts, we describe in detail the process flow of our authentication smart contract.
The BloSPAI protocol authenticates and verifies each data transmission for each field
sensor. Field sensors transmit their data from the physical layer through the Modbus
protocol. Each transmission field sensors append a signature derived through the embedded
PUF mechanism. RTUs receive the Modbus packet and, through an HLF application coded
in JavaScript, encapsulates the Modbus packet into a TCP/IP packet and forwards it to
the authentication smart contract deployed in the anchor nodes. The authentication smart
contract keeps track of the active request. Thus, the authentication smart contract already
knows the expected signature for each data transmission. Then to verify the authenticity
of sensor data, the smart contract only needs to compare the received signature and the
signature generated through the internal challenge-response pair of the field sensor.

3.5.5

Data Request Verification

To comprehensively evaluate the BloSPAI protocol, we take two characteristics that provide
helpful insights regarding the overall network overhead of the authentication protocol. First,
we evaluate the BloSPAI protocol’s performance while validating data requests of 1Kb to
10Kb from the SCADA master to the field sensor, as shown in Figure 3.8. Compared
to a state-of-art PUF-based protocol, the blockchain-based version of the SPAI protocol
achieves better performance in all data streams. The BloSPAI protocol eliminates complex,
and costly techniques such as Error Correction Codes (ECC) [74] needed to fix noisy PUF
mechanisms, e.g., XOR Arbiter PUFs [75].
The second attribute we consider to evaluate the performance of our BloSPAI protocol
is the time needed to validate the sensor’s identity and data’s integrity, namely processing
time. Similar to previous evaluations, the preliminary experiments demonstrate that the
BloSPAI protocol performs better than the state-of-art PUF-based protocol in process46
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Figure 3.8: Comparison of data overhead w.r.t data bytes sent
ing time. Through lightweight crypto solutions, the BloSPAI protocol can authenticate
data requests under the operational threshold (200ms) of traditional SCADA systems.
Compared to the previous standalone implementation of the SPAI protocol, the BloSPAI
protocol slightly reduces the processing time in RTUs and the overall network overhead
of the SCADA systems. In addition to reducing processing time, the BloSPAI protocol
introduces reliability and fault tolerance through data replication and distributed ledger.
The BloSPAI protocol offloads most of the RTU’s overhead through two smart contracts
deployed in a distributed ledger within a blockchain overlay network.
Overall, the BloSPAI achieves better network and data overhead performance. Generally, state-of-art PUF-based protocols integrate costly crypto operations such as public-key
cryptography and complex non-crypto operations, such as error correction codes. The
BloSPAI protocol can significantly reduce network and data overhead by eliminating such
complex processes. It is evident, as shown in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9 that the data stream
size impacts the performance of all PUF-based protocols. However, large data streams are
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Figure 3.9: Comparison of processing time w.r.t data bytes sent
not expected in a traditional SCADA environment. Referring to Figure 3.8, the BloSPAI
protocol slightly decreases the network overhead compare to previous SPAI implementation.
Therefore, we can conclude through the combined results of our preliminary experiments
that the BloSPAI protocol is suitable for SCADA ecosystems.
In general, the BloSPAI protocol described in this Chapter removes costly implementations that state-of-art protocol needs to validate the identity of field devices successfully.
As illustrate in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9, there is a high margin between the state-of-art
protocol and the BloSPAI protocol. The state-of-art protocol [37] proposed a PUF-based
authentication protocol that assumes noisy PUF mechanisms. Thus, the state-of-art protocol needs to implement costly error correction codes that introduce helper data that outlines
the steps to correct the noise of SRAM-based PUF mechanisms. Hence, every time the
state-of-art protocol needs to authenticate a field device, the prover and verifier need to
transmit the helper data in addition to sensing information and authentication required
information. The transmission of helper data introduces network latency and processing
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overhead that impact the operational hours of traditional RTUs. The MBRSV protocol
can achieve a high margin in terms of authentication time and data transmitted because
the protocol only utilizes robust and stable cell locations that are mapped to PUF challenges. Furthermore, the MBRSV protocol integrates a profiling phase that eliminates the
noise of PUF mechanisms, thus, eliminating the necessity of implementing error correction mechanisms. As a result, the MBRSV protocol can authenticate field devices without
transmitting costly helper data that introduce network latency and processing overhead.

3.5.6

Blockchain Network Performance

We analyze the performance aspects of the blockchain overlay network. Besides its security
features such as secure access data [49], permissioned blockchain platforms like Hyperledger
Fabric [76] provides additional performance benefits [72], (e.g. network latency). The
performance of the overall HLF network is evaluated through three attributes to evaluate
the performance of the HLF network (1) time to commit transactions, (2) peer storage
requirements, and (3) network setup time.
Unlike the BloSPAI protocol evaluation, the preliminary evaluation of the blockchain
network uses 10-minute tests. It mainly evaluates the HLF network under a different
number of blockchain peers and two setups (1) with one anchor peer and (2) with two
anchor peers. The number of anchor peers matches the number of RTUs in the emulated
SCADA system. As shown in Figure 3.10 the HLF network setup with two anchor peers
achieved the closest performance to the state-of-art SCADA threshold requirement. We
also noticed that as the number of blockchain peers increases, the average time to commit
a transaction also increases. We consider that this slight increase is due to the network
maintenance that peers need to maintain a stable connection.
As the number of blockchain peers increased, the network traffic related to communication maintenance also increased. We consider that since peers exchange more information
to just maintain stable and consistent communication, this will impact the capacity requirements of the peer. Figure 3.11 illustrates the relationship between the number of peers in
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Figure 3.10: Time to commit a transaction in the emulated physical SCADA tested,
with one and two anchor peers

the HLF network and each peer’s log size.
To finalize the HLF network evaluation, the preliminary experiments look at the time
that an administrator will need to deploy a complete blockchain network. Figure 3.12
illustrate how much each blockchain peer contributes to the required setup time. We
noticed that the setup time mainly increases while deploying the smart contracts into the
peers through preliminary experiments. It is essential to point out that the setup time
is directly related to the server’s resources or devices on where the HLF network is being
deployed.

3.5.7

SCADA Simulation Performance

The performance of the simulated SCADA network is evaluated. To evaluate the BloSPAI
protocol’s performance in a more extensive setup, the testbed integrates a fully simulated
SCADA environment on which field sensors and RTUs are represented through digital
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Figure 3.13: Time to commit a Transaction in the simulated SCADA network while
increasing the number of anchor peers

copies. The simulated network consists of 30 blockchain peers and 20 RTUs connected to
a single field sensor. Figure 3.13 illustrates 10-minute tests which analyze the confirmation
time of field sensors transactions. This experiment gradually increases the number of anchor
peers in the HLF network. The number of anchor peers is considered in the preliminary
evaluation because only through this type of peer can external application submit sensor
data to the HLF network. As shown in Figure 3.13 the overall time to mark a transaction
as confirmed remains under the operational threshold of traditional SCADA architectures
of 200ms through the experiment.

3.5.8

Findings

With the data available, we can conclude several things. First, although the preliminary
results demonstrate a slight increase in network overhead and processing time, the security
benefits like data flow integrity and continuous authentication features that the BloSPAI
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provides are indispensable. Second, by implementing lightweight crypto solutions and
smart contracts, the BloSPAI protocol can potentially reduce the overall performance of
state-of-art PUF-based protocols.
We analyze the performance of the BloSPAI protocol in two comprehensive environments. First, this Chapter discusses the implementation of the BloSPAI protocol in a
physically emulated SCADA testbed. Second, we discuss the performance of the BloSPAI
protocol in a simulated SCADA ecosystem where more anchors nodes are integrated. Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.13 illustrate the performance of the BloSPAI protocol and, in specific,
the performance of the HLF network in both environments, respectively. As shown in Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.13, the time to commit a transaction to the HLF network has an
inverse relationship with the number of anchors peers. Through the preliminary evaluation
of the HLF network, we found that increasing the number of committing peers does not
impact the committing time for the overall HLF network, as illustrated in Figure 3.10.
However, we observed that the performance of the HLF network improved as the number
of anchor peers increased, as illustrated in Figure 3.13.

3.6

Summary

This Chapter described a lightweight SRAM-based PUF protocol that aims to achieve
field sensor authentication and data flow integrity in SCADA systems. The lightweight
attributes of the authentication protocol and the PUF mechanism’s security features helped
to overcome the security vulnerabilities such as field sensor spoofing and unauthorized data
manipulation commonly found in traditional SCADA. This Chapter demonstrated through
an emulated SCADA system how the authentication protocol could prevent MITM attacks.
The authentication protocol ensures the integrity of sensor data through HMAC functions
and unique SRAM-based PUF-responses. Besides ensuring the integrity of data flow, the
authentication protocol protects the sensor identity through the embedded SRAM-based
PUF mechanism by generating a unique and unclonable device’s id based on the physical
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characteristics of the SRAM microchip. To conclude, through preliminary experiments,
this Chapter described how the BloSPAI protocol serves its purpose of achieving sensor
authentication and data integrity assurance with minimal overhead compared to existing
PUF-based protocols. It is observed that even with the explicit network overhead added
by the BloSPAI protocol, the expected performance is well under the required operational
threshold of the Modbus protocol.
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Chapter 4
Resilient System Processes Integrity
Assurance in Traditional Industrial
Control System
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) monitor the State-of-Health [10] of system processes that
provide essential cyber-enabled services such as power generation. In traditional ICS, the
state-of-health of system processes is helpful for the analysis and verification of the correct
physical behavior of heterogeneous systems. In general, system process integrity represents
the continuous authentication and verification of runtime-system-states [77]. Commonly,
ICS consists of heterogeneous field devices that follow an expected runtime-system-stat behavior usually defined by configuration files and system policies. State-of-art field devices
communicate through the Modbus communication protocol [28], which in general, takes
the trustworthiness of system processes for granted. Thus, traditional ICS are vulnerable
to false sequential attacks. Adversaries can exploit false sequential attacks to introduce
malicious runtime-system-states that could damage essential systems. Data injection [11]
attacks such as false sequential, semantic, and data spoofing can potentially disrupt the
operational hours of ICS by permanently damaging the internal mechanisms of critical systems. For example, considered the first cyberweapon, Stuxnet [5] infected Programmable
Logic Controllers that increased the frequency of uranium centrifuges, causing the centrifuges to destroy themselves.
Due to the large ecosystem and diversity of system processes in traditional ICS, operators need to maintain a large number of configuration files and system policies that
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describe the correct runtime-system-state flow for each system process. Hence, a robust
mechanism that abstracts the complexity of systems is needed. The underlying principles
of Markov Decision Process [78] (MDP) is an effective technique that improves the abstraction of complex and large ecosystems. Besides the complexity of systems processes,
ICS’s operators rely upon limited controllers that assume trusted runtime-system-states.
Therefore, security mechanisms that enforce continuous runtime-system-states must be devised to achieve robust cybersecurity and integrity assurance of runtime-system-states. The
Mandatory Results Automata [79] (MRAs) technology is appealing for addressing the lack
of runtime-system-states verification because it enables behavior-based mechanisms that
enforce runtime execution based on the history of runtime-system-states. Operators rely
on centralized controllers to monitor and manage numerous field devices’ physical states
and behavior. Thus, it is essential to devise robust distributed platforms that provide fault
tolerance and high availability. The Hyperledger Fabric [76] (HLF) technology is appealing
in the ICS context because data is shared between blockchain nodes via verified transactions, thus, ensuring transactions privacy, integrity, redundancy of nodes, and data, and
high availability.
The complexity and heterogeneously of runtime-system-state on top of centralized and
limited controllers enable adversaries to introduce rogue runtime-system-state that can
go unnoticed damaging essential devices. Therefore, providing system processes integrity
assurance has become a significant challenge. This Chapter describes a Model-based Runtime State Verification (MBRSV) protocol that addresses false sequential attacks while
providing a heterogeneous system process integrity assurance framework for ICS. Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) are commonly used to address false sequential attacks. However,
IDS [80] need a high degree of granularity to accurately calculate constrained field devices’ runtime-system-states. Unfortunately, legacy ICS ecosystems integrate proprietary
communication protocols that are not suitable for tracking runtime-system-states at the
high degree of granularity needed by state-of-art IDS. A dedicated system Runtime State
Verification (RSV) protocol proposed in [77] was designed to continuously verify and val-
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idate the runtime-system-state of field devices. However, the dedicated RSV protocol did
not address false sequential attacks in heterogeneous systems because the RSV protocol
adopted specific restrictions that limited its implementation. Moreover, besides its limited implementation, the RSV protocol also introduces processing overhead to controller
devices. Therefore, the MBRSV protocol addresses the shortcomings of the RSV protocol
by (1) offloading processing overheads to the HLF network and (2) designing a generic
protocol without becoming overly specific.
Although the MBRSV protocol achieves a generic protocol, achieving continuous runtimesystem-state integrity assurance is challenging due to the stochastic nature and complexity
of physical processes. Furthermore, adversaries exploit the lack of robust security mechanisms to deploy false sequential attacks that target the physical state of system processes.
Therefore, this dissertation also discusses runtime-system-state integrity assurance techniques necessary to ensure the security of highly stochastic ICPS such as Distributed Energy Systems (DER). We describe a Reinforcement Learning-based Runtime-system-state
Integrity (RRI) framework that aims to enable self-configurable runtime-system-states in
ICPS. This dissertation demonstrates the performance of the RRI framework by integrating emulated DER ecosystem that represents the stochastic nature of physical systems
processes. We discuss the emulated experimental SMR through the opensource OpenAI,
scikit-learn, and Stable Baselines3 platforms. The open-source platforms enable the development and comparison of Reinforcement Learning (RL) and Machine Learning (ML)
methods by enabling standard communication between baselines algorithms and ecosystems. The experimental results discussed in this dissertation provide essential insights that
help understand complex and stochastic environments. We demonstrated that the RRI
framework can provide accurate models
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4.1

System Processes Integrity Model

ICS integrates behavior-based communication protocols such as Modbus [81] that enables
the analysis of the runtime-system-states of heterogeneous processes. Unfortunately, this
legacy Modbus protocol takes the trustworthiness of system processes and devices for
granted. Hence, adversaries can exploit the lack of runtime-system-state integrity to introduce rogue runtime-system-states that cause physical damage. In this dissertation, we address false sequential attacks through the MBRSV protocol that models the behavior policy
of traditional ICS. We model traditional ICS as a sequential decision problem. The ecosystem is modeled by runtime-system-states that evolve stochastically based on the current
runtime-system-state and action. First, the MBRSV protocol models the runtime-systemstate of systems by integrating a semi-MDP that identifies the expected runtime-systemstate of traditional ICS from a configuration file. Second, we utilize the learned behavior
policy from the semi-MDP to enforce and validate the expected system’s runtime state
through a novel probabilistic MRA agent. The MBRSV protocol achieves runtime state
integrity in heterogeneous devices by constraining the implementation of traditional MDP.
In particular the MBRSV protocol integrates a semi-MDP that does not consider the optimization of rewards. By eliminating the necessity to optimize rewards the MBRSV protocol
can adopt large-scale architectures that consist of complex and stochastic systems, which
in general introduce costly overheads when considering high-fidelity emulations. Thus, the
MBRSV protocol defines semi-MDPs as partial implementation of traditional MDP.It is
worth mentioning that the MBRSV protocol does not implement reward optimization because the protocol follows operator-defined policies that outline the expected behavior in
optimal conditions.

4.1.1

Runtime State Modeling

We describe the model of the semi-MDP by the following tuple: P = (S, A, R, Pa ) where
• S = s1 , s2 , ..., sn is a set of finite states
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• A = a1 , a2 , ..., an is a set of available actions from sn
• R = r1 , r2 , ...rn is a set of relation between adjacent states. We assume a cyclic
process, thus, we consider that final transition moves to the initial state.
• Pa (s, s0) is the probability of action a in state s will transition to the new state s0
To describe the modeling of the semi-MDP, consider the system illustrated in Figure 4.1.
We assume a simplified traditional ICS that adversaries have not yet compromised. It is
worth mentioning that although the assumed traditional ICS ecosystems consist of continuous action-state spaces, the semi-MDP only integrates discrete action-state spaces. In
general, modeling continuous variables introduces complexity and processing overhead that,
in some cases, does not provide a significant advantage over discrete action-state spaces.
We selected discrete action-state spaces to demonstrate how low-fidelity emulation can
provide helpful insights into understanding complex systems such as ICS. To integrate discrete action-state spaces, we abstracted continuous states such as the boiler’s temperature
into discrete values that can be manipulated through the legacy Modbus communication
protocol. Therefore, we model discrete runtime-system-states as follows:
• S = s1 , s2 , s3 is a set of finite states that monitor the overall system state of a
traditional FPP.
• As1 = a1 , a2 , a3 , As2 = a1 , a2 , As3 = a1 , a2 is the set of available actions from state sn .
Although we assume different states for each system process, it is possible to have
the same actions in different states.
• R = (s1 , s2 ), (s1 , s3 ), (s2 , s3 ) is a set of relations that defines system process’s interactions.
• Pa1 = s1 , s2 , ...Pan = sn−1 , sn we leverage a semi-MDP to design a model of traditional
ICS. The semi-MDP defines the probability of moving to the next runtime state from
a previous state following an .
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Figure 4.1: Modeling a simplified traditional ICS through a semi-MDP

4.1.2

Mandatory Results Autonoma Modeling

Since our semi-MDP only models runtime-system-states. The MBRSV protocol leverages
MRAs to enforce continuous execution and verification of runtime-system-states. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, we adopted a behavior-based MRA [77] that considers both runtime
state input(s) and output(s) to ensure the execution of only trusted events in the system.
A = (SI, A, SO, B, Pf ), where
• SI = s1 , s2 , ..., sn is a set of finite input states
• A = a1 , a2 , ..., an is a set of available actions from sn
• SO = s1 , s2 , ..., sn is a set of finite output states
• B = r1 , r2 , ...rn is an user-defined policy behavior that outlines the runtime state
behavior of the system
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Figure 4.2: Behavior-based monitoring process through event’s authentication in MRAs
• Pf (s, s0) is the probability of system’s failure, we assume an initial state for each
system after failure
The MRA agent described in this Chapter can be deployed at different levels of the
ICS architecture. We integrate the multi-layer MRA to support large-scale ICS ecosystems
that consist of large action-state spaces. By implementing the multi-layer MRA agent,
ICS operators can abstract the operation behavior of multiple system processes, enabling
a more flexible MBRSV protocol. The MRA agent can verify runtime-system-states in
each operation cycle. We define an operation cycle as the time and states that a system
needs to process control commands fully, e.g., a temperature sensor’s cycle consists of
all runtime states commands that trigger the read of temperature from a room. If the
estimated runtime-system-state does not match the actual runtime-system-state at the end
of a cycle, the multi-layer MRA agent alerts controller devices. Besides predicting the
next runtime-system-state, the prediction MRA agent can also verify individual runtimesystem-states following a behavior policy, thus, providing process integrity assurance and
continuous authentication.
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4.1.3

Ensuring Trusted Events

As shown in Figure 4.2, MRAs consider both input and output events to enforce security
policies that constrain the runtime-system-state of processes. Although state-of-art MRAs
offer system-wide security solutions to monitor the expected device behavior, they fail to
consider rogue payloads introduced to the system at correct sequence flows, thus, failing to
trigger out-of-sequence alarms. For example, an adversary observing the interactions and
events of the system process can intercept and then transmit a rogue runtime-system-state
control command to increase the primary airflow. Since the adversary can observe the
entire exchange of events, waiting and modifying the payload of events that will pass the
MRA verification is relatively easy.
The MBRSV protocol integrates a continuous system processes authentication and verification framework that addresses malicious payloads and out-of-sequence states. The
MBRSV protocol calculates the subsequent runtime state based on the action’s success
probability and the system’s failure. Now, suppose that the MBRSV protocol verifies the
origin of all events and calculates the subsequent runtime-system-state. Then, an adversary can observe and wait for the correct flow sequence to intercept and modify an event.
However, besides getting the event, the adversary also needs to spoof the protected identity of the device and estimate the next runtime-system-state. The device’s identity in the
MBRSV protocol is protected through the integration of a distributed HLF network and
behavior policies that are only visible to the MRA agent. Therefore, for a false sequential
attack to be successful, an adversary needs to deploy two exploits. First, spoof the identity
of the field device. Second, calculate and trigger the correct next runtime-system-state that
will match with the MRA’s calculated state.

4.1.4

Limitations and Practical Applications

It is worth to clarify why the MBRSV protocol is not a Bayesian-based approach and the
advantages of implementing an MDP-based approach over Bayesian networks. A Bayesian
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network defines a probabilistic graphical representation of a network that commonly represents conditional dependencies in a directed graph. Although Bayesian networks are
implemented in predicting the likelihood of sequences, they are limited to directed graphs
and suffer from computational difficulty when prior knowledge is not available. Our MDPbased approach does not need any training data, and in general, its performance is not
impacted by the lack of prior knowledge. The MBRSV leverage MDPs to represent a
stochastic graphical representation of a traditional ICS network. Commonly, state-of-art
MDPs are used in many fields such as robotics and smart manufacturing to address complex
and large dynamic programming challenges. The significant difference between Bayesian
networks and MDPs is that the latest can transition to a new state conditionally independent of all previous states. Thus, state transitions of MDP satisfy a memorylessness
property [82].

4.2

Model-based Runtime State Verification Protocol

In general, system processes monitor complex environments with multiple heterogeneous
devices that gather critical sensing information. Due to the high dynamism of the environment, it is challenging to assure systems processes integrity and runtime state provenance. Traditional ICS are exposed to a wide range of cyber attacks that aim to exploit
false sequential vulnerabilities. False sequential cyber attacks [11] try to introduce outof-sequence runtime states damaging field devices. The MBRSV protocol aims to provide
a generic model that provides runtime state integrity assurance by integrating enhanced
MRAs and semi-MDPs. The MBRSV protocol introduces a novel sub-phase called Subsequent Runtime States that enhances the previous dedicated Runtime State Verification
(RSV) [77].
The MBRSV protocol integrates an offline pre-processing step that generates a model of
a heterogeneous ICS, that consists of all system processes that the MBRSV protocol must
monitor. A probabilistic MRA agent uses the ICS model to calculate field devices’ runtime
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state that are later used to verify overall system processes integrity. The first phase, the
process enrollment phase, creates smart contracts that the MRA agent later uses to enforce
runtime state verification in the second phase. In the following, all phases of the MBRSV
protocol are described in detail.

4.2.1

Phase-1: Process Enrollment Phase

The MBRSV protocol represents heterogeneous ICS in three levels. The high level represents the runtime state of the overall ICS ecosystem. The middle level represents each
system process, e.g., the CE process’s dependencies. Finally, the lowest level represents field
devices. All three levels consist of the same attributes, such as states, dependencies, and
component id. In Listing 1, we provide a high-level overview of the configuration file. The
MRA agent uses the runtime state information in the JSON document to define expected
runtime states of each level in the model. Dependencies are listed under ”dependency”
while a list of available messages states is listed under ”messages.” Dependencies are presented with a parent-child notion where ”prvEvent” is the last valid event, and ”nxtEvent”
is the current runtime state.
Listing 4.1: Example of a ICS model configuration File
{ ” p l a n t I D ” : ”FFP1” ,
”SP” :

[ { ” p r o c e s s I D ” : ”CE” ,

”devices” :

[{

” d e v i c e I D ” : ” 1402 ” ,
”state” :

[ 0 0 , 01 , 1 0 ] ,

” dependency ” :

[{

” prvEvent ” : 0 0 ,
” nxtEvent ” :
”state” :

01}]

}] ,

[ 0 0 0 , 0001 , 0010 , 0011] ,

” dependency ” :

[{

” prvEvent ” : 0 0 0 ,
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” nxtEvent ” :

001}]

} , { ” p r o c e s s I D ” : ”WT” ,
”devices” :
”state” :

[{...}] ,

[...] ,

” dependency ” :

[{...}]} ,

{...}] ,
”states” :

[ 0 0 , 01 , 10 , 1 1 ] ,

” dependency ” :

[{

” prvEvent ” : 0 0 ,
” nxtEvent ” : 01 } ] }

4.2.2

Phase-2: Runtime State Verification Phase

The runtime state verification phase consists of two components: (1) behavior-based authentication and (2) system process integrity. All components are represented through
smart contracts deployed in the HLF network, and they minimize network overhead and
latency by only considering critical events that aim to change the crucial runtime-systemstates.
Behavior-based Authentication Component
The first component of the second phase aims to ensure the authenticity of field devices
within a system process. The behavior-based authentication components need to consider
the performance trade-off of traditional ICS. This component leverages the legacy communication protocol Modbus to derive an optimal behavior-based authentication process,
as shown in Algorithm 4. Verifying the provenance of each runtime state is crucial in the
MBRSV protocol. If we cannot verify the provenance of crucial changing runtime states,
controllers and field devices reject the control command, triggering a notification.
A crucial element of the behavior-based authentication component is the dynamic
behavior-based id, transmitted along with each runtime-system-state. It is assumed that
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Algorithm 4: authenticateState
Input: ModbusRequest
Output: Bool
1:

conn = conn.handle.read() // read receive command

2:

request = parseM odbusRequest(conn) // parse modbus protocol

3:

hlf = HLF () // initiate HLF object
// generate ID by bitwise XOR of secretKey and requested
information

4:

hlf.ID = (request.componentID + request.state) ⊕ secreKey

5:

return verif yDevice(hlf.ID, request) // verifyDevice takes the resquest ID
and the generated ID to validate the provenance of the runtime state

during the enrollment phase, each field device in the ICS is assigned a secret key secreKey
that is securely stored. The secret key secreKey and the current runtime state are used
to generate a new behavior-based id in each transmission. The MBRSV protocol leverages
the behavior-based runtime state id to validate the provenance of control commands. Although it is essential to acknowledge the finite set of actions and possible duplicate runtime
states, the MBRSV protocol considers all previous and current runtime states. Therefore,
the MBRSV protocol can prevent replay attacks even on duplicate runtime states. In a
replay attack, an adversary aims to introduce rogue runtime states by sending old network
packets. For an adversary to successfully exploit a replay attack vulnerability, they need to
compromise secreKey and observe a large set of runtime-system-states. We assume that
observation of complex runtime-system-states demands large processing capabilities.
System Process Integrity
The MBRSV protocol ensures the correct execution of runtime-system-states through this
component. We define a correct execution when (1) the provenance of the runtime state
command can be verified. And (2) the correct sequence of states and dependencies is
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followed during a specific execution cycle. The MBRSV protocol assumes an execution
cycle in which a complete set of instructions and states are executed, e.g., in a watertube boiler, a controller executes several runtime state commands to adjust the primary
airflow of the boiler. All runtime-system-states are abstracted in a single process cycle. As
illustrated in Algorithm 5, system processes’ integrity is enforced through behavior policies
defined in the enrollment smart contract.
Algorithm 5: checkState
Input: ModbusRequest
Output: Bool
1:

conn = connection.handle.read() // parse modbus protocol

2:

request = parseM odbusRequest(conn) // get semi-MDP

3:

mdp = M DP (request.systemID) // get MRA

4:

mra = M RA(mdp)
// For each command request we need to validate the history of
requests and the following expected request

5:

for requestinlen(request) do

6:

nextState = mra.getN extState(request.systemID))

7:

currState = mra.getCurrState(request.systemID))

8:

pastState = mra.getP astState(request.systemID)) // check sequence of
states through MRA

9:

result = checkState(M RA, nextState, currState, pastState)

10:

end for

11:

return result // The MBRSV protocol triggers an alarm if the chaincode
cannot validate the sequence of runtime states

In general, the MBRSV expects a predefined behavior for each system process in the ICS.
The behavior policy is extracted during the offline process on which a model of the ICS is
created and then is passed to the HLF network in the enrollment process. In the preliminary
67

experiments, we evaluated four systems processes on which the MRA agent calculates
runtime states of each execution cycle, then an RTU compares the calculated state against
the actual field device’s state. If a device’s active state deviates from the expected state or
the sequence of previous states is not satisfied, the MBRSV protocol sends a notification.
Although we assume adversaries will significantly deviate from the expected behavior in
order to cause critical damage to physical devices, the MBRSV protocol can detect a small
out-of-sequence state, thus, addressing a wide range of false sequential attacks.
Complexity Analysis
The runtime state verification phase is crucial for the accurate detection of false sequential
attacks, thus, we focus our complexity analysis in this phase. We assume a heterogeneous
ICS ecosystem with n system processes, that we define its overhead of a system process by
the number di field devices that are part of the system. Thus, the network overhead of a
system process is presented by di × o, where di represents the number of field devices and
o represents a normalize network overhead of traditional field devices. In the same way
we can define the maximum network latency as l = di × t where t represents a normalize
processing latency. Hence, we define the processing overhead of a system process as a linear
function of Z = f (di ) where f (di ) = (di × o)/(di × t). Considering the preliminary results
shown in Table 4.1 we can estimate the network overhead of a traditional system process
with three field devices for a single data polling (di = 3 and o = 1, 534) as 4,602 bytes with
a maximum processing latency of 5.895 milliseconds. Resulting in a processing overhead of
Z = 780.66 bytes/ms. It is worth to mention that network overhead and processing latency
are directly impacted the polling rate of each system.
We conclude that a single RTU can manage n system processes if the summing-up
processing overhead of all system processes does not exceed the processing capabilities
of the RTU defined by C. We define the processing limits of the MBRSV protocol as
C ≤

Pi=n
i=1

Zi . It is also important to consider that the total processing overhead can be

addressed by introducing more RTUs. Which will also result in an increasing security of
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Table 4.1: Preliminary experiment results of a single field sensor read
Protocol

Transmission

Transmitted

Time (ms)

Data(bytes)

Raw Modbus

1.275

857

MBRSV

1.965

1534

hierarchically ICS ecosystems by integrating a decentralized control layer that addresses a
single point of failure attack through redundancy and process replication.

4.2.3

Sub-Phase: Subsequent Runtime States

The novel stochastic MRA agent addresses the shortcomings of the RSV protocol in terms
of processing overhead. Steps to calculate subsequent runtime-system-states are illustrated
in detail in Algorithm 6.
It is assumed that the MRA agent receives each runtime-system-state command, and
then based on the semi-MDP, the MRA agent verifies the expected runtime-system-state.
An ICS environment consisting of states S, actions A, and relations R that can evolve in
a stochastic manner. The integration of the stochastic MRA agent provides two crucial
attributes: (1) it offloads processing overhead from constrained controllers. By deploying
the MRA agent in the HLF network, the MBRSV protocol leverages the distributed computing power of blockchain nodes and its security attributes, such as non-repudiation and
accountability. (2) In addition to the performance enhancement, the stochastic MRA agent
introduces another layer of security to address false sequential attacks and replay attacks.
Previous research [83, 84, 77] has demonstrated the importance and the severity of false
sequential attacks. In general, detecting false sequential attacks is challenging due to the
passive characteristics of adversaries.
To have a comprehensive evaluation of the efficiency of the MBSRV protocol, we assume a compromised ICS network on which adversaries can sniff network traffic and spoof
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Algorithm 6: getNextState
Input: ModbusRequest
Output: runtimeState, hexvalue
1:

conn = connection.handle.read() // parse modbus protocol

2:

request = parseM odbusRequest(conn) // get semi-MDP

3:

mdp = M DP (request.systemID) // get MRA

4:

mra = M RA(mdp)

5:

action = request.action // get previous state

6:

prevState = getP reviousState(request.deviceID) // get curr state

7:

currState = request.state // expected next state

8:

for stateinmdp.states do // get the state that satisfies the tuple
(action, prevState)

9:

if state == prevState then // follow operator-defined semi-MDP

10:

valid, nxts tate = mdp.apply(action, prevState)

11:

if valid then
nextState = nxts tate // following the semi-MDP

12:
13:
14:

end if
end if

15:

end for

16:

if !depends(currState, prvState) then // check dependency is satisfied

17:

notif y // trigger anomaly alarm

18:

end if

19:

return nextState
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device’s identities. The scope of the MBRSV does not address the security vulnerabilities
of controllers. Instead, the MBRSV protocol addresses the lack of robust security in the
legacy communication protocols commonly found in traditional ICS devices. Assuming
a compromised network, we describe the steps that adversaries need to produce a rogue
runtime-system-state and how the MBRSV protocol prevents the false sequential attack:
• The adversary observes a stream of traffic data from multiple system processes to
identify the correct sequence when the target is supposed to receive runtime state
commands from the controller. Therefore, we assume the adversary needs significant
processing capabilities to passively obverse all network traffic.
• Once the adversary identifies the correct sequence to inject the rogue runtime state,
spoofs two crucial properties (1) the identity of the field device which is generated
on each transmission, and (2) spoof the expected next runtime state from the MRA
agent, which relies upon the security the distributed HLF network.
• Let us assume that the adversary have access to the field device and spoof the identity
and knows the correct sequence to introduce rogue runtime states. The controller
device that receives runtime states verifies each transmission through the system
process integrity phase. Although the adversary transmitted a rogue runtime state
with an spoofed identity, the security properties of distributed HLF network prevented
the adversary from compromising the MRA agent. Therefore, the controller device
can detect a mismatch of runtime states.

4.3

Evaluation Setup and Results

This section outlines the experimental setup and analyze the performance and efficiency of
the MBRSV protocol in an emulated traditional ICS that consist of four system processes,
a main controller (RTU), and HLF network.
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4.3.1

Testbed Setup

As shown in Figure 4.3, an RTU monitors four essential system processes for traditional
FPP: (1) Combustion Efficiency (CE), (2) Air Pollution, (3) Water Processing, and (4)
Energy Generation. We implemented a state-of-art RTU that validates, verifies, and authenticates runtime-system-state through the Modbus protocol. We emulated he FPP
ecosystem in a Dell PowerEdge T440 Tower Server with a 28 cores Intel Xeon and 64GB of
memory. To provide a high-level description of the FPP model, we describe the expected
runtime-system-states of the CE process as follow:
• Combustion Efficiency (CE): The objective of the CE process is to maintain
optimal combustion efficiency, e.i., is the water-tube boiler burning coal optimal.
This system process consists of four field devices, (1) a coal-hauling line that feeds a
furnace, (2) an air regulator sensor that controls the oxygen intake to the boiler, (3)
a superheater, and (4) finally an exhaust gas sensor (GS) that monitors the level of
pollutants and other gases necessary to determine the efficiency of combustion.
Our comprehensive evaluation takes into consideration four experiments setups. First,
we analyze the MBRSV protocol’s network overhead by evaluating the MBRSV protocol’s
performance in data stream size of 1Kb to 10Kb. Although extensive data stream sizes
are not standard in traditional ICS, the evaluation aims to demonstrate the scalability
attributes of the MBRSV protocol. Second, we analyze the performance and overhead of
the HLF network by gradually increasing the number of blockchain peers that validate data
transactions from field devices. Third, we evaluate the complexity of the MBRSV protocol
in terms of processing and latency overheads. Finally, we discuss the detection accuracy of
the protocol to prevent abnormal runtime-system-state.

4.3.2

Evaluation Setup

We compare the performance of the MBRSV protocol against two state-of-art protocols,
the blockchain-based SRAM PUF Authentication and Integrity (BloSPAI) [65] protocol,
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Figure 4.3: Block Diagram of the emulated FPP (evaluation setup)
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and the dedicated Runtime State Verification (RSV) [77] protocol. The BloSPAI protocol
achieved continuous authentication of field sensors through Physical Unclonable Functions
(PUFs). We emulated four systems processes that transmit runtime-system-states to the
main RTU through the Modbus communication protocol. Regarding the evaluation of the
distributed HLF network, we analyze blockchain nodes’ performance and storage capacity
while increasing the number of peers.

4.3.3

Attack Scenario

In general, the MBRSV protocol aims to prevent targeted control signals injections that
can impact the physical state of the state-of-art CE process. We assume a compromised
CE process on which adversaries can try to transmit targeted rogue control signals after
passively analysis the sequence of trusted runtime-system-states. To have a comprehensive
evaluation in a realistic scenario, we mapped the physical states of the CE processes to
discrete modbus’s states represented by hexadecimal values that can be manipulate through
the legacy communication protocol. In general, ICS consist of continuous action-state
spaces that are constantly manipulate by controllers. The modeling of continuous actionstate spaces is an open research question that ongoing research [85, 86] is trying to address
through state-of-art reinforcement learning (RL) techniques. Commonly, state-of-art RL
techniques are complex and hard to implement in realistic ecosystems. Thus, designing
and evaluating continuous action-state spaces for traditional ICS models is challenging.
Although the MBRSV protocol assumes discrete action-state spaces, our results provide
insightful details to model meaningful system behavior complex ICS models.

4.3.4

Runtime State Verification

Network Latency
Traditional ICS ecosystems have strict low latency requirements, i.e., controller devices
need real-time sensing information to make critical operational decisions. Therefore, as
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of verification time w.r.t data bytes sent
shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, we analyze the network latency and overhead introduced
by the MBRSV protocol and how the protocol performs compared with other state-of-art
protocols such as the BloSPAI and dedicated RSV protocol. The MBRSV protocol reduces
network latency because it integrates a novel probabilistic MRA agent that offloads complex operations from controllers devices. The runtime state verification latency represents
the time needed to validate the system process integrity of ICS successfully. Although
the MBRSV protocol achieves negligible improvement in reducing network latency, it is
essential to discuss the broader implementation of the novel MBRSV protocol in heterogeneous and complex ICS ecosystems. Besides introducing a faster verification time of system
processes. The novel MRA agent integrates a distributed HLF network that implements
continuous attestation and runtime provenance.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of data overhead w.r.t data bytes sent
Network Overhead
Figure 4.5 illustrates the data overhead that system processes need to transmit to implement
the MBRSV protocol requirements. We evaluate all three protocols, (1) MBRSV, (2) RSV,
and (3) BloSPAI protocol, during the transmission of equal raw data stream sizes. The
evaluation of the network overhead focuses on the performance of the RTU device that
manages and monitors all four systems in our emulated ICS. Although, the novel MBRSV
protocol offloads critical processing tasks from the RTU by integrating the probabilistic
MRA agent. All considered systems processes still need to transmit necessary information
to validate their runtime-system-states. However, we can observe in Figure 4.5, that the
novel MRA agent reduces the overhead of state-of-art RSV protocol. Moreover, compared
with the BloSPAI protocol, the MBRSV protocol reduces 82% of the amount of data
overhead that ICS systems need to transmit to authenticate and validate field devices
successfully.
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4.3.5

Hyperledger Fabric Network Performance

Next, we analyze the performance of the overlay distributed HLF network. Besides the
proven performance features of the MBRSV protocol, integrating a distributed permissioned blockchain network introduces security features, such as data duplication and fault
tolerance. To comprehensively evaluate the distributed HLF network, we analyze the overlay blockchain network through two attributes (1) time to commit transactions and (2)
peer storage requirements.
Submission Time
We evaluate the performance of the overlay blockchain network in 10-minute tests while
sending burst data streams from field devices to the RTU. As illustrated in Figure 4.6, the
time to commit a transaction to the HLF-network is under the operational threshold of
traditional Modbus protocol. As the overlay network increase, the network maintenance
traffic transmitted between peers also increases. We found that peers need to maintain
an increasing number of live connections, thus, increasing maintenance traffic. Figure 4.6
shows that the MRA deployed in the blockchain network overlay does not interfere with the
performance of the network and the MBRSV protocol can leverage the security attributes
of the MRA agent such as integrity assurance.
Blockchain Peer Storage
We observed the same trend regarding space requirements when increasing the number
of peers in the overlay blockchain network. As shown in Figure 4.7, we observe that the
space complexity of blockchain peers increases concerning the blockchain network’s size.
Although we consider an overlay distributed HLF network that does not interfere with the
core components of traditional ICS, our preliminary results illustrated in Figure 4.7 provide
helpful insight to understanding the operational requirements and constraints of deploying
a robust distributed overlay blockchain network.
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4.3.6

Scalability Performance

This Chapter, aims to enable a novel framework that captures all the needed elements
of heterogeneous ICS without becoming overly specific to certain restrictions and that
provides enough complexity to make the proofs meaningful. Besides achieving system
process integrity assurance, the novel framework leverages a distributed Hyperledger Fabric
that opens the adoption of large-scale ICS. Therefore, to provide a comprehensive discussion
and evaluation of the performance, overhead, and operational costs of the MBRSV protocol,
we evaluate the MBRSV protocol in a simulated large-scale ICS ecosystem. The large-scale
evaluation uses 10-minute tests with an increasing number of system processes, 4 to 100.
Each system consists of 50 field devices that transmit one transaction per second. In
this large-scale evaluation, we analyze the transaction commit percentage, defined as the
percentage of runtime-state-control-commands successfully validated by the RTU. Illustrate
in Figure 4.8. The novel MBRSV protocol can support a large number of systems. However,
the novel implementation is limited to the processing capabilities of physical devices, i.e.,
the maximum number of transactions that the MBRSV protocol can process relies in the
resources of controllers. We attribute the decrease in performance to the capabilities of the
single RTU, which gets overwhelmed when the evaluation passes the 36,000 transactions
threshold. Through a detailed analysis of the network traffic, we found that the RTU gets
mainly overwhelmed due to the many TCP/IP connections that must be maintained. We
also find that the RTU maintains a minimum success rate of 97%, e.g., traditional RTUs can
handle a minimum number of transaction while operating under their operational threshold.
The RTU can successfully maintain a minimum number of connections while dropping new
connection requests. Figure 4.9 analyzes the theoretical and practical capabilities of the
MBRSV protocol. As shown in Figure 4.9 we can expect a linear function that depends on
the number of systems processes. We confirm the expectation by introducing a second RTU
device to balance the incoming transactions from field devices. Illustrated in Figure 4.9, the
scalability performance of the MBRSV protocol is only impacted the processing capabilities
of RTU devices. Therefore, we can conclude that the novel MBRSV protocol achieves high79
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Figure 4.8: Success rate of system processes transactions in an emulated state-of-art RTU
degree scalability in terms of number of field devices transactions that the ICS architecture
can successfully process.

4.3.7

Abnormal Runtime-System-States Detection Analysis

Finally, we evaluate the detection performance of our MDP-based approach. To comprehensively evaluate the MBRSV protocol, we assume malicious systems that can transition
to rogue runtime-system-states, defined as Abnormal Phase (AP); this experiment analyzes the detection performance of rogue runtime-system-states with an increasing AP of
0.2 to 0.80. Rather than comparing the MBRSV protocol with state-of-art ML techniques
that generally introduce high training overhead and require large datasets. We analyze
the performance of the MBRSV protocol while trying to detect rogue runtime-systemstates accurately. It is expected that the MBRSV protocol captures and prevents all rogue
runtime-system-states. However, as shown in Figure 4.10 we observe a negligible variation
in the detection performance. It is essential to point out that the minimal variation in terms
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Figure 4.9: Traffic Network Analysis of Physical Testbed
of detection performance is related to our noisy simulation. Due to the limited hardware
resources, we simulated the different components of our ICS ecosystem in a single physical
server, thus, introducing some level of noise between components.

4.3.8

MBRSV Protocol Evaluation Findings

We discussed the performance of the generic MBRSV protocol against the dedicated RSV
protocol. Through the preliminary experiments, we have two observations. First, leveraging the security attributes of the previous behavior-based authentication and ledgerenabled services, the MBRSV protocol provides an indispensable systems process integrity
assurance and runtime state provenance for each control command in the ICS ecosystem
while achieving strict operational requirements of the legacy Modbus protocol. Second, the
MBRSV protocol introduces a novel probabilistic MRA agent that can provide a robust
processing of subsequent runtime states for system processes. The novel MRA agent leverages the distributed capabilities of the HLF network to offloads processing costs from RTU,
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Figure 4.10: Detection Accuracy of False Sequential Attacks in the emulated FPP
thus, addressing a critical shortcoming of the previous runtime state verification protocol.
Although, as shown in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 the MBRSV protocol does not significantly reduce the runtime state verification latency and overall network overhead compared
with the dedicated RSV protocol. The MBRSV protocol can be adopted in a wide range
of ICS. We categorize the MBRSV protocol as a generic framework that can provide comprehensive system processes integrity assurance with negligible overhead by integrating an
offline model processing step and a novel probabilistic MRA agent. Considering a previous dedicated RSV protocol, the Chapter describes the adoption of heterogeneous ICS
ecosystems through the MBRSV protocol.
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4.4

Enabling Reinforcement Learning for Industrial
Cyber-Physical Systems

The rapid development of autonomous Distributed Energy Resources (DER) enables the
modernization of traditional energy systems such as power grids. Conventional energy systems generally consist of stochastic system processes that monitor power generation through
system processes. Traditional monitoring approaches aiming to achieve optimal regulation
and monitoring of stochastic system processes cannot adapt to novel DER systems such
as Small Nuclear Reactors (SMR). State-of-art monitoring approaches that devise physical
models require accurate mathematical techniques and extensive knowledge of environmental
factors. In general, the complexity of physical models commonly increases in relationship
with the size of systems processes. In addition, the increase of non-stationary problems
such as the degradation of devices that impact the expected behavior of system processes
caused by the heterogeneity of system processes introduces more operational challenges
such as real-time monitoring. Non-stationary data is unpredictable and cannot be modeled with traditional time-series analysis methods. Furthermore, non-stationary challenges
enable standard false sequential attacks because Operational Technology (OT) operators
cannot quickly identify the provenance of the random behavior.
False sequential attacks [87] introduce rogue runtime-system-states that aim to cause
physical damage to essential system processes. Due to the complexity of DER, continuous monitoring of the State-of-Health (SoH) systems processes demands many resources
that are not usually available in traditional DER ecosystems. Thus, adversaries can exploit the lack of accurate continuous monitoring systems to enable Advance Persistent
Threats (APTs). Furthermore, the security and operational resilient of traditional DER
depend on legacy communication protocols that take for granted the trustworthiness of
runtime-system-states. Hence, resilient runtime-system-state frameworks that leverage the
attributes of dynamic methods to prevent malicious runtime-system-states must be devised.
Commonly, monitoring systems are based on standard behavior policies, accurate mea-
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sures, and real-time observations. However, DER ecosystems are designed to operate with
minimal interaction from Operational Technology (OT) operators. In the context of critical CPS and DER, the traditional Stochastic Hybrid System (SHS) [87] that predict the
evolution of physical process have limited applicability due to the rise of computational
overhead with the number of control systems to being monitored. Reinforcement learning
(RL) agents can provide flexible control system policies that can be adopted in large-scale
control system processes with real-time runtime-system-states. RL algorithms are most
suitable for optimization, and performance monitoring of control systems [88] because of
RL’s underlying attributes, such as model-free and data-driven learning capabilities. Also,
there has been a recent growth of applications in the cyber security of power and energy
systems, including ICS and energy distribution. As a result, RL mechanisms are integrated
to cyber solutions [89] that address security vulnerabilities in Industrial-Internet-of-Things
(IIoT). In particular the MBRSV protocol introduced the underlying mechanisms of RL
methods to address false sequential attacks while providing a heterogeneous system process integrity assurance framework for ICS. However, the MBRSV protocol failed to provide
robust runtime integrity when integrating highly stochastic ecosystems such as DER.
Therefore, this dissertation describes a Reinforcement Leaning(RL)-based Runtimesystem-state Integrity (RRI) framework for SMR. The RRI framework supports distributed
power and energy systems such as next-gen nuclear power plants. The RRI framework leverages model-free RL methods to extract crucial information for the operation and monitoring
of SMR. Through employing novel RL techniques, the RRI framework provides cyber assurance while achieving real-time runtime-system-state integrity assurance. Besides providing
resilient runtime-system-state integrity assurance to address APTs, the RRI framework
addresses the shortcomings of the MBRSV protocol. The MBRSV protocol offloaded the
processing overheads to a novel Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) network and designed a generic
protocol without becoming overly specific. However, the MBRSV protocol does not consider continuous actions-state spaces, limiting the implementation of the MBRSV protocol
in highly stochastic environments. The RRI framework can model continuous action-state
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spaces through RL methods.

4.5

Reinforcement Learning-based Runtime-system-state
Integrity Framework

DER commonly consist of complex and stochastic physical processes. In general, due to
the stochastic nature of physical processes, it is challenging to ensure runtime-system-state
integrity. Therefore, traditional ICS are exposed to false sequential cyber attacks that
exploit of lack of accurate integrity measures and target to damage critical field devices.
False sequential attacks aim to disrupt the physical state of systems and devices by introducing out-of-sequence runtime-system-states that can impact the internal operational
mechanisms of devices. This dissertation proposes the RRI framework that aims to provide
robust runtime-system-state integrity through state-of-art RL methods. The proposed RRI
framework, as shown in Figure 4.11 consists of three modules: (1) continuous monitoring,
(2) anomaly classifier, and (3) classifier optimizer.

4.5.1

RRI System Architecture

As shown in Figure 4.11 the RRI framework consists of three major modules that monitor,
estimate, classify and update the system model of SMR. The RRI framework aims to achieve
an evolving runtime-system-state integrity assurance system that continuously classifies
the expected system process behavior. The RRI framework integrates RL methods mainly
used to learn SMR models. Through the life cycle of SMR, the definition of expected
normal behavior changes based on physical degradation and possible cyber attacks. Thus,
traditional RL methods’ underlying attributes enable evolving agents to learn the dynamic
models through trial and error mechanisms.
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Continuous Monitoring
It is assumed that SMR have operational cycles that define the current system process
model. Furthermore, standard cyber attacks like false sequential attacks commonly target
the physical operation of system processes. Therefore, evolving system models must be
resilient to cyber attacks and device degradation. This dissertation integrates an RL agent
that continuously monitors the runtime-system-states of SMR. The RL agent constantly
interacts with its environment in this context, the SMR architecture. Then, in every time
step, the RL agent observes the current state of the environment and decides to take action.
The RL agent’s action depends on the current state and available actions. Through this
continuous observation of the state’s environment and actions, we can ensure continuous
monitoring of the SoH of system processes. It is worth mentioning that the continuous
monitoring RL agent lacks the necessary context to identify cyber attacks. However, this
RL agent aims to maintain an optimal operation of the SMR.
Anomaly Classifier
The RRI framework considers unsupervised learning algorithms to find features that enable
anomaly detection in complex and unpredictable processing tasks. The unsupervised learning mechanisms are suitable for stochastic SMR because, in general, it is challenging to get
label data from real-world systems. Although unsupervised learning can be more irregular,
the implemented out-of-box anomaly classifier enables the discovery of underlying patterns
and provides useful insights for real-world SMR’s data.
The RRI framework integrates a state-of-art anomaly classifier that leverages real-world
data from the pattern estimation RL agent. Although we integrate an out-of-box neural
network classifier, it is worth mentioning that the novelty of the RRI framework does not
rely on the originality of the classifier methodology. Instead, the main contribution is the
classifier optimizer that continuously updates Hyperparameters.
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Classifier Optimizer
This module aims to provide self-configurable anomaly detection methods continuously.
Unsupervised anomaly detection algorithms generally use hyperparameters that control
the learning process. Commonly, hyperparameters are defined by users during training
phases. However, in most cases, the best value is determined by trial and error mechanisms.
Therefore, the underlying mechanisms of RL agents that are mainly trained by trial and
error methods are a natural approach to optimizing hyperparameters values.
The RRI framework integrates a state-of-art Multi-Armed Bandit (MAB) [90] approach
to devise a MAB-based RL agent. As shown in Figure 4.12 the classifier optimizer aims to
generate an updated model for anomaly classification. The assumed operational cycles are
used as snapshots to help the anomaly classifier to detect behavior discrepancies between
past and current SMRs models. The RRI frameworks leverage the trial and error mechanisms of the MAB-based RL agent to determine the best hyperparameter value for each
model.

4.5.2

Detecting abnormal runtime-system-state

The RRI framework does not assume a fixed definition of abnormal behavior. As described
in Algorithm 7, the proposed RRI framework continuously updates the definition of abnormal behavior. The RRI framework integrates an RL agent that generally monitors
the performance of the anomaly classifier. As the normal behavior evolves, the anomaly
classifier needs to be adapted to the updated data points. The algorithm described in Algorithm 7 is executed alongside RL agents’ underlying mechanisms to update the definition of
normal runtime-system-states continuously. When an updated behavior model is available,
the RRI framework leverages Algorithm 7 at each operational cycle.
The RRI framework generally leverages state-of-art RL agents to model the stochastic
behavior of physical system processes such as SMRs. In this dissertation, we assume an RL
agent that monitors and learns to maintain an efficient operation of next-gen SMRs without
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Algorithm 7: detectRuntimeState
Input: runtimeState
Output: stateConfidence
1:

system goal = 1 // 100% system efficiency

2:

system state = 0.08 // operational efficiency

3:

action = agent action()

4:

states = initr eplay memory() // consider state’s history

5:

states.append(systen state)

6:

for cycle = 1 → t do

7:

last state = states.get(cycle)

8:

delta(lasts tate) // derive delta of system states

9:

getConf idence(delta) // based on the history of states we derive

10:

end for

11:

return conf idence

prior knowledge of the system or expected runtime-system-states. The RRI framework then
uses the runtime-system-states derived through the RL agent to provide OT operators a
confidence level of whether the SMR is behaving abnormally or if a cyber attack is causing
the performance degradation. It is assumed that standard cyber attacks that target to
produce physical damage to critical devices introduce a greater delta in terms of system
states than legit abnormal operations. Thus, the RRI framework categorizes higher deltas
of system states as cyber attacks.

4.6

RRI Framework Evaluation and Analysis

We discuss a comprehensive analysis of the challenges and issues of state-of-art SMR. In
this dissertation, we devised a framework that implements traditional RL and ML methods.
Commonly, traditional RL methods integrate intelligent agents that are rewarded through
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trial and error mechanisms, such mechanisms provide helpful insight into understanding
the system behavior of SMRs. Although state-of-art RL methods have been an area of
interest in cybersecurity, real-world adoption and applications are limited. Thus, in this
dissertation, we evaluate the RRI framework in a realistic emulation, in which an adversary
tries to exploit false sequential attacks. It is assumed that state-of-art SMR leverage traditional pull-push-based communication protocols that take for granted the trustworthiness
and integrity of system processes. The adversary aims to cause physical damage to SMRs
by introducing invalid physical states to system processes without triggering the anomaly
threshold. We emulated realistic SMR that consist of core system processes. The SMR was
simulated through the pymodbus framework, enabling the emulation of physical processes
through the traditional Modbus protocol. We also integrated open source Python libraries
such as Open AI, Stable Baselines3 (SB3) and Scikit-learn for developing and comparing
RL and ML method.
Attack Scenario in RRI Framework
To comprehensively evaluate the realistic emulated SMR. We represent runtime-systemstates as hexadecimal values that RL agents can monitor and manage through the pullpush-based Modbus protocol. Although we assume a standard industrial communication
protocol for SMR, the Modbus protocol is widely used in state-of-art ICS ecosystems.
Even though the Modbus protocol is categorized by its lack of robust security, it is worth
mentioning that the RRI framework does not rely upon the security of the communication
protocol. Even if we assume a more resilient communication protocol such as Distributed
Network Protocol 3 (DNP3), an adversary can still spoof the identity of field devices.
We simulate APTs in a compromised environment where the adversary can observe and
transmit rogue runtime-system-states. The assumed adversary aims to gradually drive system processes to unsafe runtime-system-states by updating state values (pymodbus values).
However, the RRI framework does not implement a real-world adversary with realistic false
data injection attacks. Therefore, we derive the simulated rogue runtime-system-states by
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observing the learned runtime-system-state from the continuous monitoring agent.

Figure 4.13: Cumulative Reward at initial training episodes

4.6.1

Convergence of value-based RL

The experimental SMR setup generally provides resilient ICS models representing the
runtime-system-state of complex processes, which we demonstrate in Figure 4.13 and Figure 4.14. We discuss the performance of the RL agents by analyzing their overall convergence time. Both Figures 4.13 and 4.14 illustrate a traditional Proximal Policy Optimization(PPO) algorithm that integrates a policy gradient method where policy is updated
explicitly. We leverage the continuously updated policy method to maintain an evolving
definition of normal runtime-system-state behavior. We evaluate the RL convergence time
in computed through 1000 episodes in which the agent’s goal is to achieve optimal utilization of processes. In Figure 4.13 we observe the initial bad performance that RL agents
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Figure 4.14: Cumulative Reward at the end of training
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generally achieve in the initial episodes. RL agents need long training sessions to learn the
underlying characteristic of the system. Thus, the high variations in Figure 4.13 show the
learning trends of RL agents. RL agents are expected to fail in the initial training phases
constantly. And as the training phase progresses, variations should decrease, as shown in
Figure 4.14.
In Figure 4.14 we observe that RL agents start to stabilize (converge) in terms of the
rewards they receive from the environment. In each episode, the agents have 30 steps to
achieve the goal. The underlying mechanisms of RL methods determine if the agent will
follow an exploration approach or if they will exploit previous knowledge. It is expected
that in the last episodes of training, the agent will tend to minimize errors, thus, minimizing
variations. We observe the expected convergence behavior in Figure 4.14. Therefore, we
conclude the experimental setups provide promising results for modeling complex ICS.
We can also observe that the PPO algorithm achieves better convergence performance at
the learning rate of 0.5. Learning rate determines how fast an RL algorithm learns the
underlying characteristics of an environment.

4.6.2

Identifying System Processes Behavior

We design and evaluate a continuous monitoring RL agent that aims to learn the underlying
characteristics of SMR. As shown in Figures 4.15 and 4.16, this dissertation analyzes highfidelity models through runtime series. High-fidelity models can represent the underlying
runtime behavior of critical like thermal and pressure monitoring systems. Figures 4.15
and 4.16 illustrate a snippet of a 100 network packets for each system. It is worth mentioning that the continuous monitoring RL agent does not assume a standard expected
system value to achieve optimal operation. Thus, the continuous monitoring module can
be generalized and adapted to heterogeneous ICS ecosystems. System processes are commonly expected to produce constant sensing information, and any deviation of the expected
output is considered abnormal. Although this dissertation does not constrain the source of
abnormal runtime states, the attack scenario mainly considers stealthy malicious runtime94

system-states introduced by adversaries.
The RRI framework introduces stealthy abnormal runtime-system-states that aim to
remain undetected by gradually updating the expected runtime behavior. Figure 4.16 illustrates the deviation detected by the continuous monitoring RL agent. We aim to simulate a
realistic stealthy attack scenario by limiting the deviation threshold introduced by the RRI
framework. The continuous monitoring agent leverages the anomaly classifier to decide if
the new runtime-system-state is under the operator-defined anomaly threshold. It is worth
mentioning that the RRI framework depends on an operator-defined anomaly threshold
to classify abnormal behavior as false sequential attacks. In general, it is challenging to
differentiate abnormal behavior from malicious behavior. Therefore, the RRI framework
introduces operational thresholds that are considered potential threats to the operational
hours of critical ICS ecosystems. The continuous monitoring RL agent shows promising results because we can derive high-fidelity system behavior profiles. Besides, system behavior
profiles can be continuously adapted to define the current normal behavior. Furthermore,
system behavior profiles can be used to analyze the underlying characteristic of update cycles. We can also leverage the results illustrated in Figure 4.16 to provide insightful system
models that profile stealthy false sequential attacks.

4.7

Summary

In this Chapter, we described the MBRSV protocol that aims to provide continuous system processes verification and integrity assurance in heterogeneous ICS ecosystems. The
MBRSV protocol implements a novel probabilistic MRA agent that calculates subsequent
runtime-system-state. The probabilistic MRA agent leverages an offline process that models
behavior policies of traditional ICS. The MBRSV protocol also leverages a distributed HLF
network to provide continuous attestation and authentication of runtime-system-states. Besides achieving system process integrity assurance, the MBRSV protocol also addresses the
shortcomings of the dedicated Runtime State Verification (RSV) protocol by providing a
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heterogeneous framework adapted for heterogeneous ICS. The MBRSV protocol uses system configuration files to generate an ICS model that is then used to define the subsequent
expected behavior policy of system processes. We analyzed the evaluation of the MBRSV
protocol through an emulated FPP that monitors the combustion of coal to generate power.
In general, the MBRSV protocol integrates an emulation of four system processes, (1)
Combustion Efficiency, (2) Air Pollution, (3) Water Processing, and (4) Energy Generation
(EG). The MBRSV protocol assumed state-of-art field devices that communicate with the
main RTU to transmit runtime-system-states. The RTU leverages an overlay distributed
HLF network to offload the processing costs of the probabilistic MRA agent. The Chapter
also discussed the preliminary experiments, which demonstrated that the MBRSV protocol provides continuous attestation, authentication, and integrity of systems processes in
traditional ICS while addressing the processing overheads of the previous dedicated RSV
protocol.
This Chapter discussed a Reinforcement Learning-based Runtime-system-state Integrity
(RRI) framework that aims to provide evolving ICPS models. The RRI framework introduces state-of-art RL methods suitable for evolving ecosystems consisting of multiple
system processes with unpredictable runtime-system-states. The underlying attributes of
standard RL methods appeal to stochastic ICPS because RL agents can learn the underlying attributes and behavior of CPS ecosystems through trial and error mechanisms.
The RRI framework consists of three components: (1) continuous monitoring, (2) anomaly
classifier, and (3) classifier optimizer. This Chapter analyzed the convergence latency and
overall performance of state-of-art RL methods such as PPO to optimize ICPS models.
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Chapter 5
High-Fidelity and Reconfigurable
Environment for Industrial Control
System Simulations
Commonly, Industrial Control Systems (ICS), which monitor complex system processes,
consist of stochastic field devices that, in general, are challenging to model into highfidelity simulations. Due to the unpredictable nature of physical environments such as
nuclear reactors and combustion of fossils achieving experimental setups with a high degree
of accuracy requires extensive computational resources. The rapid development of nextgeneration technologies such as Industry 4.0 [91] has become the backbone of the emerging
revolution of traditional ICS. Traditional ICS was designed as a closed environment with
trusted devices and honest sensing information [10]. However, the recent modernization of
traditional ICS exposes the lack of robust security to open networks such as the Internet.
Although, next-gen communication protocols enable quicker and more resilient response
time from Operational Technology (OT) operators. It also allows adversaries to exploit
security vulnerabilities such as weak access control policies, lack of robust integrity checks
and assumed trustworthiness of devices. The rapid growth of cyber attacks that target
critical ICS is partially enabled by the lack of flexible and robust experimental setups
[33]. Overall, flexible and robust experimental setups allow stakeholders to evaluate novel
security solutions without impacting real-world systems.
In general, experimental setups are used when evaluating and analyzing a novel solution
that has the capabilities to address state-of-art issues in terms of performance degradation
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and cybersecurity. It is worth mentioning that high-fidelity simulations are preferred when
high-stakes systems such as critical infrastructure are being evaluated. Critical infrastructures enable essential cyber services such as power and transportation. Thus, the economic
consequence of cyber attacks that disrupt the operational hours of traditional cyber services is exceptionally high. However, replicating the stochastic nature of physical processes
commonly found in ICS is challenging. Comprehensive analysis and evaluation of novel approaches and complete reports on the impact of standard cyber attacks are not commonly
available. Therefore, suitable technologies that can model complex runtime-system-states
of stochastic devices are needed. Modern technologies such as cluster management tools
and Virtual Machine (VM) orchestration tools that leverage high-degree modular components are appealing in the ICS context. Through the novel orchestration tools, we can
split the behavior of complex processes into manageable processes and then represent their
runtime-system-states to a high degree of granularity. Real-time data from critical ICS
ecosystems may now be accessible from anywhere. Stakeholders may use real-time data to
make data-driven choices about how to improve their operations. Without realistic ICS
experimental setups, gathering enough data to make consistently well-informed judgments
would be exceedingly challenging.
Realistic ICS experiment setups that provide high-fidelity datasets and experimental
results enable stakeholders with tools that identify the severity and probability of real-world
cyber attacks. Therefore, this Chapter describes a High-Fidelity Testbed 1 (HFT) that aims
to provide a prototype capability to address the rapid growth of cyber attacks on traditional
ICS. In addition, the flexible capabilities of the HFT can be leveraged to evaluate novel
solutions to address cyber attacks. Using state-of-art technologies, we developed automated
plug-and-play capabilities that integrate next-gen hardware to assess and compare the
operational performance of devices.
1

https://github.com/trucyber/HighFidelityTestbed
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5.1

High-Fidelity Testbed

Next-gen Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) enable more dynamic and complex communication
infrastructures in ICS ecosystems. More flexible and open communication infrastructures
would allow operators to manage and monitor critical devices from remote locations, reducing response time to operational emergencies. However, the lack of robust security
standards and the legacy limitation of communication protocols and field devices expose
critical cyber security vulnerabilities to adversaries. Adversaries can exploit security vulnerabilities, such as weak access control policies, to obtain unauthorized access and exfiltrate
confidential information due to the rapid development of next-gen technologies and the
rapid growth of cyber attacks. Therefore, researchers and stakeholders need flexible HFT
that can be constantly adapted to new technologies and capabilities to address novel cyber threats. Thus, this Chapter describes an HFT that integrates modular services and
components. As a result, the HFT enables the deployment of heterogeneous and dynamic
experimental setups that can provide meaningful insights into analyzing and evaluating
novel security approaches and next-gen technologies.
The HFT, as shown in Figure 5.1 consists of (1) a SCADA service that enables OT
operators to visualize and monitor field devices, (2) a Distributed Ledger Service (DLS)
that provides authentication and system process integrity services, (3) and a physical layer
of Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) devices that gather sensing information from the environment. The HFT’s services provide crucial processes to deploy resilient and flexible
experimental setups to evaluate novel approaches in traditional and next-gen ICS ecosystems. This dissertation aims to introduce highly modular experimental setups with minimal
implementation overheads and costs. Therefore, we split the main components into small
and portable modules, which we describe in detail in the following sections.
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HMI

5.1.1

SCADA Service

We integrate out-of-box ICS technologies to simulate state-of-art components’ behavior
and connections, such as SCADA masters. We assume a basic SCADA architecture that
consists of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) or Remote Terminal Units (RTU), which
communicate with devices such as factory machines and Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs),
sensors, and end devices. SCADA systems enable OT operators to analyze the sensing data
to make crucial operational decisions. The HFT aims to address two essential problems to
address critical security threats of traditional ICS (1) continuous field sensor authentication
and (2) robust system process integrity assurance. Furthermore, addressing the security
threats of stochastic and complex ICS ecosystems generally demands scalable and flexible
experimental setups. Therefore, we aim to provide helpful insights to identify the challenges
and limitations of state-of-art ICS components.
The HFT represents the SCADA service through multiple VMs deployed in a VM
management platform, namely, Minimega [92]. In general, SCADA systems integrate monitoring services to analyze the State-of-Health (SoH) of field devices. We simulate and
distribute the processes and tasks of the monitoring services among the four components
of the SCADA servicer. It is worth mentioning that the Kali Linux Machine is not part of
traditional SCADA systems. However, the Kali machine simulates realistic cyber threats
and offensive cyber tools that adversaries use to exploit security vulnerabilities such as
improper device authentication.
VM orchestration Simulation
We leverage the Minimega Platform to deploy four main components (1) Ubuntu pseudoPLC, (2) Ubuntu pseudo-SCADA, (3) Windows Engineering Workstation, and (4) Kali
Linux machine. To represent a realistic network, the HFT considers a network segmentation that mimics the Purdue architecture model [93]. We integrate standard TCP/IP
communication among the high-level processes of the traditional Purdue architecture. And
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we implement a private virtual network that isolates the SCADA components from other
networks. Overall the Minimega Platform enables a highly-modular framework that stakeholders can use to deploy evolving experimental setups that can be updated with minimal
implementation efforts.
Ubuntu pseudo-PLC and pseudo-SCADA
Commonly, PLCs are managed by a SCADA master that can monitor multiple system
processes. It is worth mentioning that protecting PLCs is of utmost importance when
designing security policies for SCADA ecosystems. We assume an Ubuntu VM machine
that supports a state-of-art pymodbus [94] implementation that can be used as a client/server Modbus component. We also considered other packages that simulate PCL and
SCADA connections over diverse communication protocols such as Modbus and TCP/IP.
The pseudo-PLC machines provide an interface to the HFT to emulate with high-degree details the system behavior of state-of-art field devices. We implement the pymodbus because
it enables a standard communication protocol in widely available COTS devices.
Windows Engineering Workstation
SCADA software enables OT operators to monitor the SoH of field devices. Thus, this
Chapter integrates an engineering workstation that allows sensing data visualization through
HMIs. We implement state-of-art visualization software in a Windows virtual machine. The
scope of the HFT does not consider the security or computational attributes of HMIs. It
only leverages the software to visualize sensing data. Although the HFT does not aim to
provide novel HMIs, the system architecture allows OT operators to operate traditional
and innovative HMIs.
Cybersecurity researcher machine
We implement an out-of-box Kali Linux distribution designed for security research and
security vulnerabilities analysis. The Kali machine is used to simulate compromised net104

works on which adversaries can observe traffic data flows and have a legit connection to
controller devices, to name a possible attack scenario. Next-gen ICS ecosystems consist of
heterogeneous devices with more open communication protocols that lack robust security.
Suppose an adversary exploits an insecure open port in a controller device. In that case,
it can escalate the privileges to gain network administration access. An adversary starts a
cyber attack through email reconnaissance. Then, through physical devices such as USBs
or digital tools such as phishing emails, the adversary delivers Stuxnet-like malware that
targets vulnerable devices such as Siemens S7-1200. Finally, the adversary leverages an
attack tool like Metasploit [95] to deploy rogue command and control signals. The HFT
leverages the Kali instances to deploy and host part of the chain attack, such as the Metasploit server or Stuxnet-like malware. In particular, the Kali Linux machine is designed
for cyber security researchers looking to evaluate novel cyber attacks and solutions with
realistic data and environments.
Innovative SCADA Designs
The HFT only assumes state-of-art SCADA devices and processes. However, the HFT
introduces standard interfaces that can be adapted to multiple communication protocols
and heterogeneous devices. Thus, SCADA developers, researchers, and industry stakeholders can leverage the HFT to test innovative designs to push further the modernization of
traditional SCADA ecosystems.

5.1.2

Industrial Control System Security Emulation Services

By implementing a distributed ledger platform, we enable a DLS that provides high modularity and flexibility regarding services, components, and consensus. Although the implementation of DLS is not constrained to a specific platform, the HFT prefers the performance of permissioned ledger platforms such as Hyperledger Fabric (HF) [96]. Permissioned platforms are appealing in the ICS context because their underlying technology

105

enables granularity, flexibility, and modularity while implementing resilient access control
policies. Furthermore, besides the robust role-based access, permissioned distributed ledger
platforms provide secrecy and integrity through authenticated transactions. In general, the
transactions in state-of-art distributed ledger platforms do not have to be visible to everyone. Thus, complete openness is not needed. Nevertheless, complete openness is a crucial
characteristic that many traditional ICS ecosystems rely on to provide accurate sensing
information to the controller and SCADA masters.
We leverage the out-of-box implementation of the HF platform to devise an Hyperledger
Fabric Service (HFS) for traditional and next-gen ICS ecosystems. Our proposed HFS aims
to provide two critical services to traditional and next-gen ICS ecosystems: (1) provide
continuous authentication and trustworthiness of field devices through lightweight crypto
solutions suitable for constrained devices and (2) ensure runtime-system-state integrity of
devices commonly found at the physical layer.
It is worth mentioning that the Industrial Control System Security Emulation Services
enable high availability of authentication and integrity services. We integrate a state-of-art
distributed ledger that ensures continuous availability of system processes through fault
tolerance and data replication mechanisms. The distributed ledger implemented in this
dissertation assumes resourceful blockchain nodes that enable a robust P2P network. In
general, every node in the P2P network partially enables the authentication and integrity
services required to verify the provenance of sensing information and runtime states of
field devices. It is crucial to clarify that the security emulation services do not provide
availability in terms of physical devices. The future work of this dissertation will address
availability challenges for physical field devices.
Resilient Sensor Authentication Service
Traditional ICS ecosystems lack robust security mechanisms to ensure continuous authentication and verification of field devices [64, 65]. Therefore, it is essential to devise suitable
mechanisms that can provide resilient sensor authentication through the life cycle of con-
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strained field devices. We describe a Resilient Sensor Authentication Service (RSAS) that
leverages our implementation of the HF platform. Our proposed RSAS consists of two
services: (1) enrollment service that gathers the necessary information to accurately identify field devices and (2) authentication service that continuously verifies the provenance of
sensing information as well as the identity of the device. Both phases are deployed through
the implementation of chaincodes. A chaincode in the HF platform describes the behavior
and functions of smart contracts. We design and develop all chaincodes in Go [97]. All
services deployed through chaincodes are available to anchor nodes through RESTful APIs
that enable continuous interactions with our distributed ledger platform.
Enrollment Interface
The enrollment service assumes suitable crypto solutions for constrained devices such as
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [98]. This service assumes two crucial roles (1) a
verifier that challenges a device to create unique IDs and (2) a prover that needs to prove its
identity through PUF-based mechanisms. In Figure 5.2 we observe a high-level overview of
the enrollment service, which consists of field devices, PLCs, and chaincodes. In addition,
Figure 5.2 illustrates the communication flow and interfaces that the service enables. The
steps to implement the enrollment service are the following:
• The verifier challenges the field device (prover) to generate unique identity responses.
It is assumed that through the statistical variations of PUF-based mechanisms, adversaries can’t duplicate the identity responses even if they capture the issued challenges.
• Then, combining challenges and responses pairs (CRPs), the verifier generates a
unique identity for each prover. The security and secrecy of CRPs are delegated to
the underlying security of distributed ledger platforms. In general, security attributes
such as data replication, fault tolerance, and large distributed networks provide robust
security that ensures the protection of confidential information.
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Figure 5.2: Simplified Enrollment Service
• Finally, an operator can enroll the field device by deploying a new object in the
enrollment chaincode. The object representing the field device can then be used to
add new identity responses as the life cycle of the field device evolves. It is worth
mentioning that critical information that adversaries can exploit is exchanged during
the enrollment of new field devices. Thus, secure channels are necessary.

Authentication Interface
Overall, the authentication interface enables operators to continuously authenticate and
ensure field devices’ trustworthiness. The distributed ledger platform assumes resourceful
controllers that support RESTful API applications needed to transmit sensing data to the
overlay distributed ledger platform. Figure 5.3 illustrates the components, services, and
communication channels that the RESTful API uses through the authentication phase.
Through preliminary evaluations, [64, 65] we found that the authentication interface is
essential to address identity spoofing attacks and rogue sensing data. Besides addressing
identity spoofing attacks, past implementations of the authentication interface enable fault
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Figure 5.3: Simplified Authentication Service
tolerance and data replication by integrating the distributed ledger platform. Furthermore,
the complexity and processing overheads of verifying and authentication of field devices are
offloaded to the HF platform. Therefore, the authentication interface introduces negligible
network overhead.
Robust Systems Process Integrity Service
ICS ecosystems generally rely on field devices’ SoH to forecast maintenance cycles and make
critical operational decisions to prevent abnormal runtime-system-states. Unfortunately,
legacy communication protocol such as Modbus takes the trustworthiness of processes and
devices for granted. Hence, enabling adversaries to potentially impact the operational hours
of ICS ecosystems through rogue runtime-system-states that target the physical behavior
of insecure field devices. The System Process Integrity (SPI) Service address the lack
of robust security mechanisms that introduce false sequential vulnerabilities in the ICS
ecosystems. The SPI service enables ICS’s operators to monitor the SoH of field devices,
i.e., the SPI service prevents false sequential attacks by integrating suitable process integrity
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mechanisms that keep track of honest runtime-system-states and can identify rogue control
signal commands. This Chapter describes an essential interface of the SPI service, the
State Integrity Interface.
State Integrity Interface
As shown in Algorithm 8, a state integrity chaincode is built and deployed to keep track of
the current and prior device’s runtime-system-state. The state integrity chaincode enforces
operator-defined runtime-system-state policies through the distributed ledger platform, enabling operators to have a broader understanding of complex system processes that are commonly stochastic and challenging to model with high accuracy. A key attribute of the state
integrity chaincode is that it enables OT operators to map active runtime-system-states
with the expected behavior that is commonly defined by historical data and process observation. Also, by leveraging the security attributes like non-repudiation of the distributed
ledger platform, controllers can alert SCADA masters of abnormal runtime-system-states.
In general, Algorithm 8 tracks and parses each data packet from field devices. However,
the State Integrity Interface described in this Chapter considers discrete actions from field
devices. Therefore, Algorithm 8 only needs to keep track of the previous runtime state and
predict the following based on operator-defined behavior policies.
Innovative Security Emulation Services
In particular, the security emulation services introduced by the HFT enable the development and evaluation of novel security solutions that address cyber attacks such as data
spoofing and Main-In-The-Middle (MITM). Overall, the complexity and processing capabilities of the distributed ledger platform are abstracted and hidden from OT operators and
SCADA users. Therefore, the security services mainly enable researchers and developers
to develop and test innovative security solutions that provide robust and resilient security.
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Algorithm 8: getNextState
Input: ModbusPacket:event
Output: runtimeState
Require: Access to enrollment chaincode
1:

request = readP acket()

2:

deviceID = request.deviceID

3:

action = request.action

4:

dependency = request.getDependency() // get dependencies of system process

5:

prevState = getP reviousState(deviceID)

6:

currState = request.state

7:

if !validState(state, deviceID) then // is the event valid for the given
device

8:
9:

notif y
end if // probability of next state

10:

predictedState = P (action, currState) // check dependency is satisfied

11:

if !depends(currState, predictedState) then

12:

notif y // alert abnormal state

13:

end if

14:

return nextState
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5.1.3

Hardware-In-The-Loop

Although traditional ICS ecosystems consist of heterogeneous devices, communication protocols and operational data are commonly locked by third-party providers. Therefore, OT
operators need to work with third-party providers to provide support and address abnormal
behavior of field devices. The need for third-party providers limits the adoption of open
source and generic solutions that have the potential to address security issues in shorter
cycles of deployment and testing. An essential characteristic of the proposed HFT is evaluating different hardware without necessarily being limited to specific third-party solutions.
This dissertation integrates a modular PLC controller, the PFC200 WAGO I/O system.
The state-of-art controller supports digital and analog modules that can be leveraged to
emulate field devices. The PFC200 controller integrates a Linux operating system that OT
operators use to monitor the SoH of critical field devices. The Linux systems enable highlevel applications such as Docker containers and C programs. Due to the limited hardware
resources, this dissertation only considers the PFC200 WAGO controller. However, the
underlying applications of the SCADA services do not assume a specific type of controller.
Thus, enabling a flexible and scalable framework where OT operators can evaluate and
analyze a wide range of controller devices such as RTUs and PLCs.

5.2

Implementation Setup and Experimental Results

This section describes our implementation setup and discusses the experimental results
of HFS and SCADA service. We deploy the Hyperledger Fabric platform in an out-ofbox implementation of Kubernetes cluster [99]. The Kubernetes cluster enables a scalable
distributed platform that can adapt to the number of devices in the network and the number
of processed transactions. We also simulate traditional field devices through the minimega
VM management tool [92]. Both services, HFS and SCADA service, are simulated in a
rack system that consists of five PowerEdge R740 Rack Server with 2nd Generation Intel
Xeon Scalable processors with up to 28 cores and 100GB of memory and also four Dell
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PowerEdge T440 Tower Server with a 28 cores Intel Xeon and 64GB of memory. It is
worth mentioning that the HFS and SCADA service are implemented in separate virtual
clusters with dedicated networks. Also, it is assumed that Hardware-In-The-Loop (HITL)
components are in individual networks.

5.2.1

High-Fidelity Testbed Setup

Figure 5.4 shows the physical rack system that supports both HFS and SCADA services.
We deploy the HFS in a Kubernetes cluster with version v1.21.5. The Kubernetes cluster
consists of one master node and four worker nodes. The SCADA service leverages four
rack serves that are clustered through Minimega 2.7. It is worth mentioning that all
cluster machines have access to Network File System (NFS) server. The NFS server is
needed to facilitate sharing configuration files such as channel artifacts for the HFS and
network configuration for the SCADA service. Figure 5.4 illustrates the virtual components
and tools that are used to emulate and deploy the services. The architecture of the HFT
consists of three virtual layers distributed across the physical servers. In general, the
Hypervisor Instances manage the business-oriented services that monitor and manage the
overall SoH of field devices. To enable high modularity and separation of services and
networks, we integrate VM instances that we represent with blue squares and Kubernetes
pods that we represent with black ovals.

5.2.2

Hyperledger Fabric Network Experiment Setup

We envision an out-of-box Hyperledger Fabric platform v2.2 consisting of 20 processing
peers, 30 orderer peers, and ten anchor peers. To evaluate the performance of the HF
platform, we assume a standard operation of a traditional ICS ecosystem in which field
sensors transmit sensing information through controller units. The Kubernetes cluster
consists of peers that communicate over the TCP/IP protocol. Furthermore, due to the
underlying technology of Kubernetes, the pods that represent the diverse components of
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Figure 5.4: Physical Rack Server Implementation of HFT
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the HF platform are exposed to external networks through Kubernetes services, namely,
ClusterIPs.”
Transaction Confirmation Time
To comprehensively evaluate the HF platform’s performance, we analyze 10-minute experiments where state-of-art field devices send data streams to controller devices. As shown
in Figure 5.5, the time to commit and process blockchain transactions to the HF platform is under the operational threshold of the legacy Modbus protocol. The operating
threshold is crucial to comply with ICS ecosystems’ low latency and real-time operational
requirements. We found that processing peers need to maintain an increasing number of
live connections as we increase the number of peers. Thus, increasing maintenance traffic
and introducing more processing overhead to blockchain peers. Figure 5.5 illustrates how
increasing the number of peers (x-axis) in the HF platform reduces the average time to
commit (y-axis) to commit sensing data transactions. We evaluate the time to commit
transactions in milliseconds because SCADA ecosystems demand low latency operations.
As shown in Figure 5.5 even with a low number of peers, the HFT achieves low transaction
time.
System Utilization
We analyze the performance of the HF platform in terms of both CPU and memory utilization in the idle setup and in the running-HF setup. To have a comprehensive and
truthful analysis of the cost and overhead of running an out-of-box Hyperledger Fabric
implementation, we analyze the systems utilization in a Dell Precision Mobile Workstation
with 11 Gen Intel Core i5-11500H and 16GB Memory. The system utilization of the HF
platform was recorded once per second. Results of the memory utilization are shown in
Figure 5.6 and CPU utilization are shown in Figure 5.7. Memory utilization is constant at
22%, representing 4GB, through the scenario. Due to the underlying technology of Kubernetes, the overall CPU utilization remained below 18% through the experiment. Figure 5.6
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Figure 5.5: Average Time to Commit Transactions in HF Network
and Figure 5.7 shown the operational cost of running the HFT. Both CPU and Memory
utilization are measured in percentages based on the workstation’s available resources. We
compare the processing overhead and cost against idle baselines for each attribute.
In summary, we found that the HF platform can be deployed on a system with relatively
limited resources in terms of memory and CPU. Considering situations when distributed
ledger platforms must be configured in small-scale networks and tuned dynamically to
support a small number of transactions per second. Only one instance of core components
can be instantiated to support core functionality. Still, as more information is needed,
more resources become available. As the size of the network increases, the HF platform
can easily scale to support more complex architectures.
Peer Storage
Finally, when the number of processing peers in the HF platform grew, we noticed a
similar pattern in terms of space complexity needed for processing peers. As shown in
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Figure 5.8, the space complexity of processing peers grows in proportion to the size of
the HF platform. Despite the fact that we assume an overlay distributed ledger platform
that does not interfere with traditional ICS core components, our results provide useful
insight into the operational requirements and constraints of deploying a robust distributed
ledger platform is constrained and resource systems. Overall, Figure 5.8 illustrates the
cost of storing sensing data from field devices. Unlike the CPU and Memory utilization,
the experimental evaluation of the HFT does not consider a standard amount of available
storage to consider peer storage baselines.

5.2.3

SCADA Experiment Setup

The SCADA simulation consists of high-level layers and devices that support TCP/IPbased communication protocols that transmit sensing data over open networks such as
the Internet. Also, the HFT allows low-end layers consisting of state-of-art industrial
field devices that generally assume traditional ICS communication protocols [100]. Due to
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limited hardware resources, this dissertation mainly considers the Modbus protocol [101] to
integrate state-of-art HITL components such as humidity sensor DHT11 and PFC200 I/O
controller.
SCADA Evaluation
We evaluate the SCADA experiment with four state-of-art protocols (1) MBRSV protocol,
(2) RSV protocol, (3) BloSPAI protocol, and (4) SPAI protocol. We take two characteristics that provide helpful insights regarding the SCADA setup’s overall network overhead
and latency. First, we evaluate the SCADA setup’s performance while validating data requests of 1Kb to 10Kb from the SCADA master to the field sensor, as shown in Figure 5.9.
To comprehensively evaluate the SCADA platform, we analyze the amount of extra data
the state-of-art protocol needs to transmit alongside standard communication. Figure 5.9
illustrate the additional data (y-axis) per every Kb (x-axis) that the state-of-art protocol
transmit. RSV protocol enables resilient system process integrity without introducing ex-

119

Authentication Time (in ms)

30
25

MBRSV protocol
RSV protocol
BloSPAI protocol
SPAI protocol

20
15
10
5
0
2

4

6

Data Stream Size (in Kb)

8

10

Figure 5.10: Comparison of processing time in state-of-art protocols
cessive transmission overhead. All four protocols generally achieved operational thresholds
that comply with traditional ICS ecosystems’ low latency and real-time requirements.
Second, we discuss, as shown in Figure 5.10 the time needed to validate sensing information with the four protocols. The runtime state verification latency represents the
time needed to successfully validate ICS’s system process integrity. Our experimental setup
can authenticate data requests under traditional SCADA systems’ operational threshold
(200ms) through lightweight crypto solutions. Besides operating under the operational
threshold, the HFT introduces reliability and fault tolerance through data replication and
distributed ledger, respectively. It is evident, as shown in Figure 5.9 and Figure 5.10 that
the data stream size impacts the performance of all four state-of-art protocols. However,
large data streams are not expected in a traditional SCADA environment. We can conclude through the combined results of our preliminary experiments that the HFT provides
helpful insights into understanding the requirements of traditional ICS ecosystems.
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5.3

Summary

This Chapter described a High-Fidelity Testbed (HFT) that leverages state-of-art cluster
and VM management tools to enable an open-source, scalable, and modular experimental
setup for traditional and next-gen ICS ecosystems. The HFT leverages core technologies
like Kubernetes and minimega that enable highly modular experimental setups. Without
loss of generality, the DLS leverages the underlying capabilities of Kubernetes to deploy
an out-of-box Hyperledger Fabric platform that consists of orderer, processing, and anchor
peers. In general, the HF platform process and verifies the sensing information of field
devices and data transactions from ICS components. The minimega VM management tool
is used to deploy state-of-art ICS components such as SCADA masters and RTUs. To have
a comprehensive and realistic experimental setup, we assume traditional ICS components
that follow state-of-art communication protocol that OT operators can leverage to monitor
and manage field devices’ physical state. This Chapter discussed the preliminary results of
the Fossil Power Plant (FPP) case study. We simulated the core components of the FPP to
analyze the performance and implementation cost of high-fidelity experimental setups. We
found that high-fidelity experiment setups provide insights into the implementation challenges of real-world ICS ecosystems. ICS consists of heterogeneous devices and applications
with diverse capabilities and attributes that generally introduce higher levels of complexity. Furthermore, the HFT enables stakeholders to analyze the impact of real-world cyber
attacks such as false sequential attacks and identity spoofing.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
ICPS’s communication protocols generally lack robust security mechanisms to ensure continuous device authentication and system process integrity. As a result, adversaries can
exploit cyber threats such as false sequential attacks and spoofing attacks to disrupt the
operational hours of ICPS through breaches of process data. Therefore, it is important to to
investigate and architect a provenance framework for generic ICPS that ensures continuous
device authentication and system process integrity assurance. This dissertation analyses
two crucial problems to address critical security threats of ICPS (1) continuous field sensor authentication and (2) resilient system process integrity assurance. Addressing the
security threats of ICPS demands novel and lightweight security frameworks that identify
the challenges and limitations of traditional ICPS systems through thoughtful analysis of
state-of-art constrained devices and communication protocols.
First, we devise a continuous authentication and attestation protocol. In this dissertation we describe the BloSPAI protocol that aims to ensure a continuous authentication
of field sensors and provide a robust data flow integrity process by leveraging distributed
ledger and hardware security primitives. The protocol prototype has been implemented in
a sensor-integrated Raspberry PI testbed that is interfaced with a permissioned blockchain
network. Next, we discuss the performance and overhead aspects of the proposed BloSPAI
protocol and compare it with state-of-art cybersecurity solutions. We demonstrate the relationship between blockchain’s size and the impact on network throughput regarding the
time commit transactions and overall systems setup time.
Second, we describe a resilient runtime-system-state assurance protocol. This dissertation discussed the MBSRV protocol that addresses semantic attacks in the SCADA ecosys-
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tem by integrating behavior-based Mandatory Results Automata (MRA) and a Hyperledger
Fabric (HLF) network. The MBRSV protocol provides high process integrity assurance
through enhanced behavior-based MRA suitable for constrained field devices. A proof of
concept of the MBRSV protocol has been evaluated in an emulated ICPS on which preliminary evaluations aimed to measure the efficiency of the protocol by monitoring system
processes. We analyze the overall network overhead and latency of the MBRSV protocol
by evaluating the HLF network performance and comparing the MBRSV protocol with the
state-of-art protocols.
Finally, we discuss a flexible experimental setup that enables the evaluation and analysis of high-fidelity simulations. Due to the stochastic nature and complexity of real-world
ICS architectures. It is challenging and cost-constrained to develop high-fidelity emulations
with the capabilities and resources to emulate real-world architectures. In this dissertation,
we describe a high-fidelity experimental setup that enables the integration of state-of-art
systems. The HFT platform described in this dissertation allows for realistic ICS emulations
through highly modular resource management frameworks. These state-of-art frameworks
provide a resilient platform for OT operators, system engineers, and security researchers
to safely implement and evaluate novel approaches that aim to address traditional ICS
ecosystems’ security vulnerabilities and performance issues. Furthermore, the novel HFT
experimental platform integrates hardware-in-the-loop components. Commonly, ICS architectures monitor the operation of physical system processes. Thus, hardware-in-the-loop
components are essential for achieving robust and flexible ICS architectures.

6.1

Future Research Agenda

In the future, we plan to extend the three main thrusts of our research by addressing the
following shortcomings and important challenges:
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6.1.1

PUF Reliability

Although, the preliminary evaluation of the BloSPAI protocol assumed a constant and
stable environment to analyze the performance of the PUF-enabled devices. It is essential
to clarify that all PUF mechanisms are affected by external environmental factors such as
heat and power fluctuation. A future iteration of the BloSPAI protocol will also analyze
the performance, reliability, availability, and portability of other types of PUF mechanisms.
Future work will examine the integration of a more comprehensive evaluation environment
in which we will analyze the performance and reliability of PUF-enabled devices under
different environmental conditions.
Distributed Challenge-Response Pair storage
The BloSPAI protocol assumed resourceful blockchain peers capable of addressing the space
complexity of a single Fossil Power Plant with hundreds of field sensors. However, the
BloSPAI protocol is limited to the capacity of blockchain peers in terms of space complexity.
Furthermore, the BloSPAI protocol assumed a constant fetch time to get a random CRP.
Therefore, the protocol’s performance is not impacted by the number of field sensors or the
CRPs’ size. Future work will explore the HLF network’s performance in a multi-location
SCADA context with multiple blockchain peers and dedicate channels for each SCADA
layer. Multi-location SCADA ecosystems can integrate thousands of field devices. Future
work will analyze sharding CRPs to offload space complexity from HLF peers in multilocation SCADA ecosystems.

6.1.2

Multi-agent RL mechanisms for runtime-system-state integrity assurance

Robust modeling of complex and stochastic ICS ecosystems must also integrate the heterogeneity of large-scale architectures that generally consist of thousands of devices distributed
in large geographical locations. Integrated Internet-Enabled Field Devices (IEFD) enables
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more connected architectures on which multiple devices must cooperate to achieve a goal.
Cooperation between diverse systems demands novel techniques to coordinate and share
confidential information. Due to the sensitive nature of critical ICS architectures, sensing
and operational data need a high degree of confidentially to assure robust security. Therefore, future work will explore intelligent multi-MRA agents that leverage RL methods and
Federated Learning (FL) [102] algorithms to explore and learn system behavior policies.
FL approaches are suitable for the multi-system processes challenges because their underlying mechanisms enable secure and trusted models to share confidential information among
multiple parties.

6.1.3

Next-Generation ICS ecosystems

The evolution of next-gen ICS ecosystems to interconnect multiple remote systems and
networks is being driven by novel communication technologies such as 5G. IEFD introduce
new security vulnerabilities and increase the complexity of experimental setups. Thus,
future iterations of the HFT framework will address the fine-tuning of modern communication technologies on which IEFD can be leveraged to reduce the latency and provide
real-time analysis at edge devices. Furthermore, future iterations will analyze the trade-off
between implementation cost and secure communication requirements of public next-gen
communication technologies. Besides analyzing next-gen communication technologies, future iterations will discuss the trade-off of deep learning algorithms to enable the robust
deployment of trustworthy models that can represent highly stochastic ICS ecosystems with
high accuracy.
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